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NEPA, Nukes and NonProliferation: Clarifying the
Transnational Impact Statement
Mandate in Nuclear Export
Licensing
by EDWARD JOSEPH KRAULAND
J.D. University of Michigan, 1980;
Member, District of Columbia Bar Association.

A.

I. INTRODUCTION
The Historical Context

Ten years have passed since the enactment of the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 1 yet the statute's transnational 2 mandate remains uncertain. One unfamiliar with this area
might attribute this uncertainty to the insufficient opportunities
judges or legislators have had to address the problems of NEPA's
transnational application; or one might perceive the question of
transnational NEPA enforcement as one of relatively recent vintage. History and experience, however, prove otherwise. Indeed,
within five months of NEPA's enactment into law, the Department
of State expressed its opinion to the Council on Environmental
Quality (CEQ) that NEPA did not apply to certain foreign affairs
activities of the United States government.3 Since that time, CEQ
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1976).
2. The term "transnational" is preferred over "international" or "extraterritorial" in
most usage. The term "transnational" connotes that the issue concerns environmental impacts occurring within a foreign country but arising from a major federal action in the
United States. This distinguishes those considerations that may properly be designated "international," i.e., originating in the "common areas" of the globe, or "extraterritoriaL" i.e.,
reaching beyond one nation's boundaries but not necessarily transgressing the borders of
another nation. In the discussion that follows, "transnational application" of NEPA refers
to the application of the statute to environmental impacts occurring within a foreign sovereign territory.
3. See Appendix to Hearings on the Administration of the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation of the
House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries,91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1425 (1970) [herein-
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has disagreed with several foreign affairs agencies on this issue and
has maintained that NEPA's environmental protection mandate is
fully applicable in the foreign affairs sector.- For the most part,
courts have carefully avoided involvement in this dispute, content
to allow the executive branch agencies to resolve this dilemma in
their own way.
The battle lines of this bureaucratic in-fighting have not been
clear. To be sure, no federal agency has advocated total abdication
of United States responsibility for protecting the global environment. Rather, the debate has focused on the applicability of
NEPA's procedural mandate, specifically Section 102(2)(C)'s environmental impact statement (EIS) requirement, to activities
originating either inside or outside the territorial United States but
having an effect within the territory of another country.5 At one
time, opponents of the applicability of Section 102(2)(C) to transnational activities 6 argued that NEPA only required bilateral or
multilateral cooperation with other nations in protecting the global
environment against adverse environmental impacts.7 These advocates pointed to Section 102(2)(E) 8 as the alternative environmenafter cited as Oversight Hearings] (Memorandum from Christian A. Herter, Jr., Special Assistant to the Secretary for Environmental Affairs at the Department of State, to Russell
Train, Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality).
4. See, e.g., Memorandum to Heads of Agencies on Applying the EIS Requirement to
Environmental Impacts Abroad, from Russell W. Peterson, Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality (Sept. 24, 1976).
5. See Proposinga Treaty Requiring Preparationof InternationalEnvironmental Impact Statements: Hearings on Senate Resolution 49 Before the Subcomm. on Arms Control, Oceans, and InternationalEnvironment of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 Hearings on Senate Resolution 49]
(testimony of Robert C. Brewster, at 6-11, 14; Charles Warren, at 14-17; Alice Brandeis
Popkin, at 19, 23; Eldon V. C. Greenberg, at 26-27; Leonard C. Meeker, at 27-28; Thomas B.
Stoel, at 33-34).
6. The major opponents to transnational application of NEPA's EIS requirement are
the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
and the Export-Import Bank.
7. See, e.g., Export Study Group Report, InternationalReach of NEPA (NRC Commissioner Action Paper No. SECY-77-280, June 6, 1977); OFricE OF Tm GENmRAL'CoUNSEL,
U.S. DmE'T OF DEFENSE, TE APPLICATION OF NEPA TO MAJOR FEDERAL ACTIONS wrrH ENviRONMENTAL IMPACTS OUTSIm THE UNITED STATES, reprinted in 124 CONG. REC. S 19358
(1978).
8. Section 102(2)(E) states, in relevant part[A]ll agencies of the Federal Government shall ... recognize the worldwide and
long range character of environmental problems and, where consistent with the
foreign policy of the United States, lend appropriate support to initiatives, resolutions, and programs, designed to maximize international cooperation in anticipating and preventing a decline in the quality of mankind's world environment.
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tal mandate which governed international activities and environmental responsibility.
CEQ and the Environmental Protection Agency traditionally
have argued the opposite position, i.e., despite the cooperation
mandate found in Section 102(2)(E), NEPA Section 102(2)(C) imposes its EIS requirement on all major federal actions, whether
they occur within the United States or in a foreign country,
whether they have an effect within the United States, on the global
commons, or wholly within a foreign country.9
One may ponder the cause of these conflicting viewpoints
within the Federal bureaucracy. To some extent, the conflict may
be the latent symptom of Congress' rapid transformation of environmental concerns into law, without sufficient consideration and
discussion of NEPA's jurisdictional limits. Over time, the laudatory objectives and policies enacted into law in 1969 may have
come into conflict with other important objectives expressed in
subsequent legislation or adopted by subsequent administrations
dealing with the dynamics of global politics. Since Congress and
the courts have eschewed the issue of NEPA's transnational application, United States administrative agencies have had to cope
with this troublesome issue on an ad hoc basis without guidance.
The results to date have been unsatisfactory, characterized by a
persistent confusion and uncertainty surrounding the applicability
of NEPA to foreign affairs activities. Ultimately, this bureaucratic
battle may lead to detrimental policy formulation that not only
impairs United States foreign relations, but also sacrifices important environmental values.
Finally, no discussion of NEPA's transnational mandate can
ignore the intrinsically ambiguous policy underlying United States
international environmental responsibility. The applicability of
NEPA's EIS requirement in the transnational context creates a
certain tension not present in the domestic arena. International legal principles and foreign political considerations can often collide
with moral or humanistic concerns. Several legal and political arguments would support a strict limitation of the NEPA EIS mandate when foreign local environmental impacts are involved. These
arguments are rooted in notions of respect for foreign sovereignty,
the desire to avoid undue interference in the affairs of another gov42 U.S.C. § 4332(F) (1976).
9. Peterson Memorandum, supra note 4.
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eminent, and a reluctance to impose (or even appear to impose)
United States environmental/development values on another
culture.
By comparison, moral responsibilities suggest that U.S. officials scrupulously examine foreign local environmental impacts,
before engaging in a course of action with transnational ramifications. Here, the concern is to avoid taking actions that unnecessarily pollute either the common areas of our earth or the territories
of foreign governments; this may be particularly true of nations
that, in the initial stages of industrialization, may be inattentive to
global and local environmental values that become increasingly important with time. Despite the potential foreign relations problems
of offending foreign governments with intrusive EIS analysis, countervailing foreign policy and humanistic reasons may support a
cautious extension of NEPA's EIS mandate to foreign local environmental impacts. Thus, preventing catastrophic environmental
damage in foreign territories not only serves United States foreign
policy interests, but also comports with basic notions of moral responsibility. There are no easy answers to the question, "How far
can or should the United States extend its environmental protection policy to activities of United States agencies affecting the environment within a foreign government's jurisdiction?"
B.

The Nuclear Export Context

With an issue that has remained unresolved for so long, it is
not surprising to find the law reviews and legal periodicals peppered with a considerable amount of legal writing regarding
NEPA's extraterritorial application. 10 Upon examining this literature one finds no clear focus on the various issues and problems
presented by transnational environmental protection, for the issue
is one of vague and indefinite proportions. It is my hypothesis that
by narrowing the transnational NEPA question to a particular
field of inquiry-namely, nuclear reactor export licensing-the is10. See generally Robinson, ExtraterritorialEnvironmentalProtection Obligations of
Foreign Affairs Agencies: The Unfulfilled Mandate of NEPA, 7 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL.
257 (1974); Tarlock, The Application of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 to
the Darien Gap Highway Project, 7 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 459 (1974); Note, The International Scope of NEPA's Environmental Impact Statement Requirement, 74 MICH. L.
REv. 349 (1975); Galton, The Scope of the NationalEnvironmental Policy Act, 5 SYRAcusE
J. NAT'L L. & COM. 317 (1978); Gaines, Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Federal
Actions: An Executive Order Ordainsa National Policy, 3 HARv. ENV''L L. REV. 136 (1979).
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sues of NEPA's transnational reach will become more vivid and
manageable.
When considering the application of NEPA to nuclear facility
exports, the basic inquiry is whether an environmental impact
statement, (examining the foreign local enviromental impacts associated with the construction and operation of a United States-exported nuclear reactor) is required before the appropriate United
States government agency can issue an export license. Framing the
question in this fashion highlights a consideration apparently ignored in the legal literature to date; i.e., assuming that a nuclear
reactor export is a "major federal action" under NEPA, are the
subsequent foreign environmental impacts associated with the exported reactor too remote from the initial licensing decision to fall
within the EIS mandate?
Licensing of a nuclear reactor export and the subsequent environmental impacts in the foreign territory may be so attenuated as
to preclude effective and accurate preparation of an EIS. This notion of attenuation is not limited merely to the cause-and-effect
relationship between a federal action and the subsequent environmental impact. Rather, in the nuclear export licensing context
(and the general area of transnational NEPA application) federal
decision-making and subsequent environmental impacts are attenuated further by the absence of United States control over the nuclear reactor project located in the foreign territory, the difficulty
of obtaining necessary information and data for an informed EIS
analysis, and the divergency of United States environmental values
and foreign industrialization objectives.
From a legal-political point of view, several developments
since the enactment of NEPA provide additional context for
resolving the question of NEPA's transnational application in the
field of nuclear export licensing. In 1976, the Energy Research and
Development Administration11 completed a voluminous environmental impact statement for the United States nuclear power export program.1 2 This statement purported to examine and evaluate
the effects of United States commercial nuclear power exports and
11. The former Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was reorganized into two separate
federal agencies-the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) and the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)-pursuant to the Energy Reorganization Act of

1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5891 (1976). Thus, although the AEC initiated the study, the ERDA
completed it.
12. See ERDA, FINAL ENVRONMENTAL STATEMENT ON UNITED STATES NUCLEAR EXPORT

AcTxvriEs (1976) [hereinafter cited as ERDA-1542].
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related activities on the United States (the domestic effects) as
well as on the high seas and atmosphere (the global effects). However, ERDA did not examine the foreign situs environmental impacts associated with nuclear exports. Such environmental impacts, it was argued, were either the proper subject of bilateral
negotiation and cooperative efforts, or fell solely within the jurisdiction and decisionmaking authority of the foreign government.1"
Since 1976, Congress has enacted a new statute that revamped
the nuclear export licensing process.14 Also, President Carter issued an Executive Order requiring all federal agencies to develop
procedures that take into account the foreign environmental impacts of their international activities. 15 Such procedures have been
promulgated by the Department of State for nuclear export licensing 6 although not without considerable public debate. Westing-

house, a major nuclear supplier, challenged the authority of the
NRC and Department of State to consider potential foreign environmental, health and safety aspects of a nuclear reactor in the
export licensing process. 17 Additionally, a major public interest
13. ERDA-1542 was a comprehensive analysis of the environmental consequences of the
United States nuclear power reactor export program through the year 2000. In this document, the United States government sought to provide a thorough discussion of environmental impacts on the United States and global environs, but expressly avoided an assessment of specific impacts in particular foreign nations:
A comprehensive evaluation of the environmental effects of the contribution of
U.S. exports to this growth of nuclear power in the world community requires
extensive data on individual sites as well as the present and planned regulatory
frameworks and standards of foreign nations. Such a comprehensive analysis if
undertaken by the U.S. on a unilateral basis likely would create risks of international repercussions arising from claims of encroachment by the U.S. on other nations' sovereignty since decisions as to the acceptability of risks to the health and
safety of a nation's citizens and to its physical environment traditionally have
been reserved to the responsible sovereign government. Therefore, a comprehensive cumulative analysis on a country-by-country basis can only be done on a
multilateral basis.
ERDA-1542, supra note 12, at 1-2 (Executive Summary). See also Export Study Group
Report, supra note 7, at 8-9 (Executive Summary).
14. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, 22 U.S.C. §§ 3201-3282, 42 U.S.C. §§ 20112160a (1979). The NNPA established specific criteria for making a nuclear export licensing
decision and created explicit procedures and deadlines to expedite the decision making process. See text accompanying notes 124-137 infra. This was in response to the extended licensing delays occurring under the AEA.
15. Exec. Order No. 12114, 44 Fed. Reg. 1957 (1979), 3 C.F.R. 356-60 (1980).
16. 44 Fed. Reg. 65,560 (1979).
17. Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Vance, No. 79-2110 (D.D.C., decided August 31,
1979) (denying plaintiff's request for preliminary injunction), appeal dismissed No. 79-2069
(D.C. Cir. Nov. 27, 1979).
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group has sued the NRC to prevent a nuclear export on the basis
of inadequate consideration given to the environmental, health,
and safety problems associated with the reactor's placement and
operation in a foreign territory."" These new developments, as well
as the importance of the NEPA-nuclear export debate, warrant a
fresh look at United States environmental responsibility and legal
duties beyond United States borders.
C.

Framework of Analysis

Throughout this discussion, it must be remembered that the
basic inquiry is one of procedure-whether the EIS requirement
found in Section 102(2)(C) of NEPA is fully applicable to nuclear
export licensing and whether it encompasses environmental impacts arising wholly within a foreign jurisdiction. Although the
analysis is limited to nuclear reactor exports, for the purpose of
our inquiry it may make little difference when applied to fuel shipments, or other types of nuclear cooperation and commerce. Differences that may exist are probably of factual import alone (such as
the magnitude of the environmental impact), and are not of legal
or policy significance.
This article will set forth the basic framework for nuclear export licensing, briefly exploring the legislative history of the initial
atomic energy legislation. It will then turn to an examination of
NEPA, its legislative history, and relevant judicial and administrative decisions interpreting the statute. The analysis then examines
newly enacted nuclear export legislation and its possible impact on
the NEPA environmental impact statement requirement. In addition, the most recent administrative response to the problem is examined, along with the competing international legal and foreign
policy considerations evidenced by the administrative response.
On the basis of this analysis, this author concludes that
NEPA's environmental impact statement requirement does not apply to foreign local environmental impacts arising wholly within
the foreign territory from nuclear reactor exports. On its face,
NEPA, as well as its legislative history and judicial interpretations
appear to impose an environmental duty on United States govern18. National Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, No. 801477 (D.C. Cir., filed June 27, 1980). This case was decided while this article was in the
process of being published; it is reported at Natural Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, 647 F. 2d 1395 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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ment agencies that falls short of mandatory and full-scale EIS
analysis. Moreover, an inconsistent legal mandate may exist in the
nuclear export licensing arena, evidenced by the Nuclear NonProliferation Act of 1978.19 Finally, there are compelling practical,
legal, and political considerations that militate against the fullest
extension of NEPA's EIS requirement in the transnational context. Thus, NEPA Section 102(2)(E) may provide the basic instrumentality for protecting foreign environments from unintended
consequences of United States nuclear cooperation. The analysis
concludes by recommending that in the absence of a congressional
response clarifying NEPA's application to foreign affairs, the
courts may adopt the ad hoc, jurisdictional "rule of reason" approach as articulated in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of
America.20 In addition, extensive bilateral cooperation, including a
conscientious United States effort to provide relevant information
and expertise to the recipient foreign government, would comport
with existing environmental obligations under NEPA and the
NNPA. This avenue would maximize environmental protection in
the transnational context while minimizing the potential adverse
diplomatic and foreign policy effects that often attend any extraterritorial application of United States laws.2 1

II. NUCLEAR EXPORT LICENSING UNDER THE
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954
The basic framework for nuclear cooperation and exchange between the United States and other nations was established by the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954.22 Most of the NEPA litigation involving United States nuclear activities has occurred under the AEA
before it was amended in 1978. Therefore, a brief review of this
statutory scheme is necessary to understand the course of the
NEPA-nuclear export debate and understand the change in United
States policy wrought by the NNPA in 1978.
19. 22 U.S.C. §§ 3201-3282, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2160a (1979).

20. 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 1976).
21. In FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-A-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1326 n.145
(D.C. Cir. 1980), the court noted that several nations had enacted statutes to prevent the
extension of United States antitrust laws into their jurisdictions.
22. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1976). Most simply stated, under the AEA, United States
enterprises apply to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for a license authorizing the applicant to export nuclear material or facilities to a foreign purchaser located in another country. In this way, the United States government can regulate the flow of sensitive nuclear
technology from the United States to other nations.
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Section 3(d) of the AEA announces the basic policy of the
United States atomic energy program as one of encouraging utilization of atomic energy and commercial development "consistent
with the common defense and security and with the health and
safety of the public. '23 For purposes of ascertaining the regulatory
purpose and possible environmental content of the AEA, the
meaning of the phrases "common defense and security" and
"health and safety of the public" is critical.
These two phrases are not used in tandem throughout the
AEA. For instance, Section 3(e), which governs international cooperation, only mentions the "common defense and security." No
mention is made of "health and safety of the public" 24 except as it
is generally employed in those sections governing the domestic distribution of nuclear material or licensing of facilities.25 Section 103
covers the licensing of production and utilization facilities (e.g.,
nuclear reactors) and would appear to require that all licenses
meet the health and safety standards of the NRC. However, when
this section discusses nuclear exports, the principal criterion is
that the export transaction occur under the terms of an agreement
for cooperation. Moreover, Section 103 states that the NRC could
not issue an export license for a production or utilization facility if
the Commission was of the opinion that the export would be "inimical to the common defense and security. '2 6 Thus, the AEA reflects an export scheme which imposes two basic criteria for issuing
a license: (1) the export must not be inimical to the common defense and security, and (2) the export must occur under an appropriate agreement for cooperation, i.e., a bilateral agreement between the United States and the recipient nation that sets forth
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2013(d) (1976).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2013(e) (1976).
25. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2013(d), 2073, 2093, 2111 (1976). But see those sections authorizing the foreign distribution of nuclear material which do not refer to "health and
safety," 42 U.S.C. §§ 2013(e), 2074, 2094, 2112, 2121 (1976).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2133, 2133(d) (1976). Section 123 of the AEA provided some broad criteria for the issuance of a license for all facility and special nuclear material exports. Under
that section, the recipient nation must have entered into a valid agreement for cooperation
with the United States and given a guarantee that "security safeguards and standards...
will be maintained," that material transferred under the agreement will not be used for
atomic weapons or other military purposes, and that material or Restricted Data will not be
transferred improperly. 42 U.S.C. § 2153(a) (1976).
This section also required the President to determine that an agreement for cooperation
negotiated between the United States and the recipient nation would not "constitute an
unreasonable risk to the common defense and security." 42 U.S.C. § 2153(b) (1976).
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conditions for nuclear cooperation.
The initial debate over environmental responsibility in the nuclear export arena focused on the amorphous phrase "common defense and security" since this appeared to be the major (and
broadest) requirement for an export license. Those seeking to stop
exports argued that this phrase encompassed a broad environmental protection mandate. 7 Looking to the statute itself, Section
11(g) defines the phrase "common defense and security" to mean
the common defense and security of the United States.28 Apart
from this definition, the statute provides no further insight into
the meaning of this language.
Turning to the legislative history of the AEA, we find that the
concept of "common defense and security" embraced notions of
national security and military preparedness or superiority in the
field of atomic weaponry. 29 For example, one Senate Report on the
AEA noted:
[A]lmost any cooperation with any foreign country can be said to
involve some risk to the common defense and security of the
United States. The provisions incorporated into section 123 [dealing with military security and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons] are designed to permit cooperation where, upon weighing
those risks [of proliferation] in light of the safeguards provided,
there is found to be unreasonable risk to the common defense and
security ....

80

Given Congress' preoccupation in 1954 with the military balance
between the United States and the Soviet Union, it would be difficult at best to read a transnational environmental protection man27. In 1977, environmental public interest groups filed numerous petitions with the Nu-

clear Regulatory Commission seeking permission to intervene in the export licensing process
and claiming that the Commission should prepare an EIS for major nuclear exports pursu-

ant to the AEA's mandate to protect the "common defense and security."
28. 42 U.S.C. § 2014(g) (1976).
29. See Atomic Energy Act of 1954: HearingsBefore the Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy, PartII, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 683-707, 698-700 (1954) (Statement of John Foster Dulles

regarding international activities under the amended Act); S. REP. No. 1699, 83rd Cong., 2d
Sess. (1954); H.R. REP. No. 2181, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1954); CoNF. REP. No. 2639, 83d
Cong. 2d Sess. (1954). In talking about information dissemination, S. REP. No. 1699 notes:

The joint committee has been keenly aware of the critical role of information control in helping assure this Nation's continued atomic supremacy. We have recommended legislative changes in this area ... on the basis of our carefully considered judgment that these changes will promote our common defense and security.
S. REP. No. 1699, supra, at 8 (emphasis added). See also 100 CONG. REC. 10084-10094
(1954).
30. S. REP. No. 1699, supra note 29, at 22.
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date into the licensing criterion of "common defense and security."
In deciding whether to issue an export license under the unamended AEA, the NRC would submit a series of questions to the
Department of State in order to obtain information as to the impact of a proposed export on United States "common defense and
security." Virtually all of these questions bore directly on national
security and non-proliferation considerations; none involved an assessment of foreign environmental factors.3 1 In responding to these
questions, however, the State Department could as a matter of discretion examine foreign environmental factors that would somehow
affect the United States "common defense and security."32 Yet, it
must be remembered that the critical question is whether environmental considerations are mandatory in every licensing
determination.
As for the second "element" of export licensing, i.e., the agreement for cooperation, it is noteworthy that these legally binding
instruments of international commerce generally reserved environmental and safety considerations for the recipient foreign government. 3 This observation reinforces the strong inference against
unilateral United States environmental assessments in the export
31. The eight questions can be paraphrased as follows: (1) What is the purpose of the
proposed export; (2) Does the recipient nation have an agreement for cooperation with the
United States; (3) Has the recipient nation accepted and implemented International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards; (4) Are the accounting and inspection procedures, in
circumstances where IAEA safeguards are not applicable, adequate; (5) What is the adequacy of the physical security measures for the safe storage of nuclear fuel; (6) What is the
position of the recipient government with regard to the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons;
(7) What understanding exists, if any, between the recipient government and the United
States regarding the use of United States nuclear material and facilities for the development
of any nuclear explosive device, as well as its position regarding the use of non-United
States supplied materials for nuclear explosive devices; and (8)Are there only other factors
which may bear on the issuance of the export license? In re Babcock & Wilcox, 5 N.R.C. at
1352-53; Westinghouse Electric Corp., 3 N.R.C. 737, 745-48.
32. See Westinghouse Electric Corp. supra note 17. Under the "common defense and
security" criterion, the Department of State retains its traditional discretion in the foreign
affairs area, and can consider any foreign policy factors, including environmental impacts
within a foreign territory, that may affect United States national security. In the Westinghouse suit filed against the Department of State, it was the position of the government that
the foreign local environmental factors associated with the placement of an exported nuclear
reactor to the Philippines did come within the "common defense and security" criterion, as
a matter of discretion exercised by the Secretary of State in this particular case. The United
States had military forces stationed in the area of the proposed nuclear reactor project. The
possibility of a fault-line near the proposed reactor site generated concern over the stability
and integrity of the reactor. This could have serious foreign policy repercussions for United
States-Philippines allied relations.
33. See note 182 infra.
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licensing process.
As a matter of administrative interpretation, the NRC has
consistently refused to read the AEA as requiring review of foreign
health, safety, or environmental factors associated with the foreign
government's proposed nuclear project.3 ' This is not to imply that
the NRC ignores cooperative efforts to minimize environmental as
well as health and safety risks. To the contrary, the NRC has actively supported international endeavors to prevent environmental
damage, and has sponsored several research projects in the field of
reactor safety for domestic and exported reactors alike. 5
On two occasions the Commission has examined the environmental content of the AEA in the context of administrative hearings. In both instances, the Commission found that the AEA did
not require assessment of foreign local environmental impacts
before issuing a nuclear export license. 8 Nevertheless, decisions in34. See, e.g., cases cited at note 36 infra; Export Study Group Report, supra note 7.
35. For example, NRC's formal bilateral arrangements with foreign regulatory authorities include systematic information exchange on safety analysis, operating experience, safety
research and regulatory policy. The arrangements also allow for bilateral cooperation in the
development of regulatory safety standards.
In the international arena, NRC cooperates with the International Atomic Energy
Agency in the development of codes and standards for nuclear power reactors. Moreover,
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development has a Nuclear Energy Agency
that conducts nuclear reactor safety meetings to which the NRC sends it representatives.
NRC is also involved in multilateral cooperation with other nations in reactor safety programs, such as the Loss of Fluid Test. See generally 1976 ANN. REP. oF THE NRC (1976).
36. On May 7, 1976, the Commission issued an opinion and order on petitions filed by
the NRDC, Sierra Club, and the Union of Concerned Scientists who were seeking to intervene and obtain an adjudicatory hearing on the export of low-enriched uranium fuel to India's Tarapur Atomic Power Station. In re Edlow Int'l Co., 3 N.R.C. 563 (1976). The decision had three fundamental bases: (1) conclusions regarding the environmental content of
the AEA, (2) conclusions regarding the application of NEPA to nuclear fuel exports, and (3)
conclusions on the international legal principles that constrain the exercise of United States
jurisdiction over foreign environmental matters. As to the ABA, the Commission stated:
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, while requiring us to make export decisions (as
all others) with a view to the "common defense and security of the United States",
notably omits reference to the public health and safety in its provisions addressed
to international matters.
3 N.R.C. at 582. The Commission then explained in greater detail the particular provisions
governing export activities, finding "that only common defense and security considerations
are relevant to export matters." Id. at 583.
Nearly a year later, on June 27, 1977, the Commission again confronted the issue of
United States environmental responsibility in the nuclear export licensing process. Unlike
the first case, however, the license application under examination was for the export of a
nuclear reactor. In re Babcock & Wilcox, 5 N.R.C. 1332 (1977). Here, a German environmental group-Bilrgeraktion Atomschutz Mittelrhein e.V. (hereinafter referred to as
BAM)-petitioned the NRC for standing to challenge a nuclear reactor export to the Federal Republic of Germany. BAM argued that the Commission had a duty to prepare an EIS
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dicate that in appropriate cases its licensing staff might analyze
the United States domestic impacts associated with the export and
operation of a nuclear reactor in a foreign country. However, the
Commission noted that ERDA's 1976 Final Environmental Statement (ERDA-1542) had provided a generic analysis of the United
States domestic impacts for the entire United States nuclear power
37
export program.
The absence of clear statutory language, the paucity of legislative guidance, and the history of administrative practice illustrate
the difficulty of finding a transnational environmental protection
mandate in the AEA. Without more, this statute alone cannot be
read to impose an affirmative obligation on United States agencies
to examine environmental impacts within a foreign jurisdiction
before authorizing an export of nuclear material or equipment. The
search for such an obligation inevitably leads to the National Environmental Policy Act itself.
III. NEPA AND THE TRANSNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL MANDATE
In 1969, Congress enacted the National Environmental Policy
Act and thereby expressed a national concern over the trend of
industrialization and progress that largely ignored environmental
values. Despite Congress' salutary intention, several federal agencies maintained that the objectives and procedural requirements of
NEPA did not encompass certain federal activities. Moreover,
some agencies claimed that NEPA's objectives and procedures
clashed with their primary functions, as established by their organic statutes or other legislative enactments. 8 It is in the area of
international commerce and foreign affairs that federal agency opposition to NEPA's application has been most fierce.
analyzing the environmental impact of the proposed reactor on the West German environment before acting on the export license application. The Commission refused to grant
standing to BAM, and in deciding the case it addressed the issues raised by the petition.
The Commission analyzed both the AEA and NEPA, concluding that the AEA did not provide an independent basis for examining foreign local environmental impacts.
37. In re Babcock & Wilcox, 5 N.R.C. at 1341.
38. Generally, those agencies listed at note 6 supra have maintained this position.
Moreover, some federal agencies have litigated the question of NEPA's applicability to their
activities in limited circumstances. For example, pursuant to a settlement agreement in Environmental Defense Fund v. Agency for International Development, 6 Envt'l L. Rep. 20121
(D.D.C. 1975), AID promulgated regulations specifying certain procedures for assessing environmental factors associated with AID development projects in foreign territories.

Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review

[VoL 4

A. Interpreting NEPA's Transnational Mandate-The
Statutory Language
On its face, NEPA is ambiguous as to its scope of application.
In delineating the purposes of NEPA, Congress tried to establish a
"national policy" for the protection "of the ecological systems and
natural resources important to the Nation."39 Section 101(a) declares that it is "the continuing policy of the Federal Government
. .. [to] use all practicable means and measures... to fulfill the
social, economic, and other requirements of present and future
generations of Americans. ' 40 In Section 101(b)(2) and (4), Congress
expressed concern with coordinating federal programs to the end
that the nation may "assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and aesthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings,
[and] preserve important
historic, cultural and natural aspects of
'41
our national heritage.
On its face this language reveals a peculiarly "national" perspective. These statements of purpose, however, do not stand
alone. As other commentators have noted, the objectives of NEPA
include broad aspirations. 42 What Congress implied through references to the "American people" and "Nation," it also impliedly refuted through language that recognized the inherently transnational character of the environment. NEPA makes references to
"biosphere," "man" and "environment" without delineating the
territorial United States as a jurisdictional limit. NEPA embraces
a national policy that would
encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and
his environment ... promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the
health and welfare of man ....
Similarly, Section 101(a) recognizes "the profound impact of man's
activities on the interrelations of all components of the natural environment" and declares that "it is the continuing policy of the
Federal Government... to create and maintain conditions under
which man and nature can exist in productive harmony....
39. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1976).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1976).

41. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1976).
42. See generally, Robinson, supra note 10; Note, supra note 10.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1976).

44. 42 U.S.C. 4331(a) (1976).
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In light of the statute's extensive procedural requirements,
these general references to the human environment are far from
persuasive in determining the transnational reach of NEPA. In
fact, the broad language of NEPA only acknowledges that environmental issues are the concern of all people and appropriately characterizes the scope of environmental problems as of global proportions. As such, this language is of a descriptive nature and is
arguably not of much legal significance. In light of the competing
references to the United States and American people, as well as
the general presumption in American jurisprudence against extraterritorial application of United States laws,4" one must look elsewhere to find a basis for extending the procedural EIS requirement
into the realm of foreign environmental impacts.
Closer scrutiny of the structure and content of NEPA uncovers an additional ambiguity. Section 102(2)(C) requires federal
agencies to prepare an environmental impact statement for all
"major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment."' "4 However, Section 102(2)(E) states that all
federal agencies must:
recognize the worldwide and long-range character of environmental problems and, where consistent with the foreign policy of the
United States, lend appropriate support to initiatives, resolutions, and programs designed to maximize international cooperation in anticipating and preventing
a decline in the quality of
7
mankind's world environment.4
Without clarification, Section 102 seems to establish two procedures: one requiring a formal EIS for all those actions significantly affecting the human environment, and another requiring
less formal cooperative efforts for those actions affecting the world
environment and implicating foreign policy considerations. Accordingly, one could interpret Section 102(2)(E) as only establishing a
minimum obligation to enter into cooperative negotiations that
would augment, in appropriate circumstances, the required EIS
under Section 102(2)(C). In light of the expansive judicial interpretation given to this mandate in domestic NEPA cases, i.e., that all
federal agencies must comply with the EIS requirement "to the
45. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
quoted in text accompanying note 176 infra.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C) (1976).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (F) (1976) (emphasis added).

§ 38 (1963),
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fullest extent possible,"4 s this two-tier characterization of the
transnational mandate could portend a future distinct standard for
international NEPA litigation.
On the other hand, Section 102(2)(E) may be considered an
exclusive procedural requirement for those agencies acting in the
area of foreign affairs. In this view, the conspicuous foreign policy
caveat indicates a clear concern for the practical and diplomatic
difficulties of conducting United States foreign affairs. One could
argue that if Congress intended federal agencies to consider foreign
policy objectives in their efforts to encourage internationalcooperation on environmental matters, a similar balancing would be appropriate in unilateral United States efforts to examine environmental impacts associated with a specific project undertaken in a
particular country. The absence of the foreign policy qualification
in Section 102(2)(C) would indicate Congress' intention to apply
the strict EIS requirements only to activities within the United
States or territories over which
the United States government ex9
ercised exclusive control.'
Even the scope of Section 102(2)(E) is ambiguous. This provision does not impose a duty to assess, consider, or even engage in
bilateral examination of foreign local environment impacts arising
from United States activities. Rather, this section exhorts United
States government agencies to lend "appropriate support" to maximize "international cooperation" in anticipating and preventing
damage to the "world environment." The language strongly suggests that federal agencies enjoy a certain degree of discretion in
determining when and what type of assistance to lend other nations. Multilateral cooperation, not unilateral decision making of
the United States government, appears to be in order. The primary
focus on the "world environment," implies the global commons as
contrasted with specific foreign local environs. "Appropriate support" also evokes a notion of discretionary involvement by United
States agencies rather than mandatory EIS analysis in interna48. See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1118
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
49. In looking to the entire statute in order to interpret the meaning of specific provisions, it is interesting to note one provision within Section 101 which has been largely ignored in past efforts to interpret NEPA. According to Section 101(c), "The Congress recognizes that each person should enjoy a healthful environment and that each person has a
responsibility to contribute to the preservation and enhancement of the environment." 42
U.S.C. § 4331(c) (1976). Congress can only define the responsibilities and aspirations of
American citizens.
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tional cooperative efforts.
In short, the language found in NEPA is far from enlightening. Various interpretations readily lend themselves to those seeking to assert one position over another. Thus, recourse must be had
to NEPA's legislative history in order to gather additional insight
into the relative strengths of these alternative interpretations.
B. Interpreting NEPA-The Legislative History
Several commentators have noted the distressing lack of congressional debate regarding the jurisdictional reach of NEPA. 50
Yet, it is puzzling to see authors focussing on isolated statements
regarding the international environment drawing different conclusions as to NEPA's transnational application."'
The debates on NEPA were extensive, and it would be impossible to describe the totality of NEPA's legislative history in concise fashion. Hence, this analysis begins with the initial debates in
1969 and highlights the relevant discussion on NEPA's transnational mandate. The goal of this endeavor is not to arrive at a
dispositive conclusion regarding the Congress' intent on the issue
of applying NEPA's EIS requirement to foreign local environmental impacts. To be certain, there is no clear and dispositive statement on this particular question. Rather, this effort is directed toward distilling from the legislative history the principal concerns
and purposes that provided the impetus for NEPA in general, and
Section 102's procedural duties in particular. These fundamental
concerns and purposes necessarily delineate the problems that
were to be remedied by NEPA and, at the very least, they point to
the methods that were to be employed in the process. Thus, the
concerns that underlie NEPA's genesis also direct us to the proper
interpretation of NEPA's scope and procedural requirements.
During the gestation stage of the 1969 environmental legislative movement, Senator Jackson, a major spokesman and proponent of NEPA,52 discussed in meticulous detail the general pur50. See Tarlock, supra note 10; Note, supra note 10, at 365, 371.
51. See, e.g., Note, supra note 10; Galton, supra note 10.
52. Senator Jackson's remarks regarding the purpose, content, and legislative intent behind NEPA will be the main focus of this legislative analysis. As noted by the Supreme
Court, the statements of the major proponent of a piece of legislation should be accorded
the greatest weight in determining the meaning of the legislation. "It is the sponsors that we
look to when the meaning of the statutory words is in doubt." Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert
Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 394-95 (1951). See also Judge Wright's reliance on Senator
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poses and scope of his environmental proposals. Most of his
remarks were directed toward formulating a coherent federal policy for protecting the United States environment. He characterized
the NEPA effort as a "task of deciding whether or not the objective of a quality environment for all Americans is a top priority
national goal."'5 3 While recognizing that the environmental problem was one of national and international proportions, Senator
Jackson explained that a national environmental policy must "define the intent of the American people toward the management of
their environment .... Additionally, Jackson described the national environmental problem in terms of economic and developmental costs which Americans had to consider as an element of
continued industrial progress. 8' 5 The environmental effort was
portrayed as a national program that would enable U.S. decision
makers to manage the American environment for the benefit of
present and future Americans. 6
Jackson's statements in Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n,
449 F.2d at 1125-26. (In the course of his presentation, Senator Jackson introduced a report
written by Professor Lymon K. Caldwell, Dep't of Gov't, Indiana State University, for the
use of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Where the text relies on a
passage from that report it shall so be indicated in a parenthetical after the citation to the
Congressional Record).
53. 115 CONG. REc. 3701 (1969) (Report).
54. Id. at 3702.
55. See generally 115 CONG. REc. 3702-04 (1969) (Report). See also Senator Jackson's
Remarks, 115 CONG. REC. 40417 (1969) where the Senator enumerated the "problems" that
NEPA was intended to ameliorate, most of them being of a peculiarly local or national
flavor.
As an example of the "cost accounting" and "management" concepts that run through
the debates, it should be noted that in a speech that first hinted of the EIS requirement,
Senator Jackson stated:
A national system of environmental cost accounting expressed not only in economic terms but also reflecting life-sustaining and amenity values in the form of
environmental quality indicators could provide the Nation with a much clearer
picture than it now has of its environmental condition. It would help all sectors of
American society to cooperate in avoiding the overdrafts on the environment and
the threat of ecological insolvency that are impairing the national economy today.
115 CONG. REc. 3703 (1969) (Report).
56. Toward the close of the debates, Senator Jackson again referred to the national
focus of the proposed legislation, stating that it was his view "that S.1075 will provide an
equally important national policy for the management of America's future environment."
115 CONG. REC. 40416 (1969) (emphasis added). Other members of Congress had evinced a
similar focus in earlier discussions in the House of Representatives. See, e.g., the remarks of
Mr. Feighan, 115 CONG. REc. 26577 (1969) (supporting the establishment of the CEQ "to
advise the President and, through him,0 the Congress on steps that should be taken to improve the quality of the American environment."); remarks of Mr. Dellanbach, 115 CONG.
REc. 26578 (1969) ("When we deal with this basic concept of the environment we have
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This is not to say that the legislative history is devoid of discussion concerning the transnational character of environmental
problems and issues. The congressional debates necessarily described the environmental problems facing the United States as
being of global proportions. In fact, one draft of the environmental
proposal contained a section calling for international cooperation
of those aspects of the environment that transgressed national
boundaries. 57 Senator Jackson noted that the United States had a
stake "in the protection and wise management of man-environment relationships everywhere."5 Moreover:
The requirement to maintain and enhance long-term productivity
and quality of the environment takes precedence over local,
short-term usage ....Although the influence of the U.S. policy
will be limited outside of its own borders, the global character of
the ecological relationships must be the guide for domestic activities. Ecological considerations should be infused into all international relations. 59
For the most part, the transnational environment was commonly described in terms of the global commons, such as "the
oceanic, polar, and outer space environments." 60 No strong interest
was essential in the foreign local environs subject to the sovereign
jurisdiction of another government. Although these statements
warrant the inclusion of an environmental protection mandate
akin to that found in Section 102(2)(E), it cannot be that said that
the same language indicates a congressional intent to impose the
EIS requirement on activities either occurring in foreign countries
or giving rise to environmental impacts peculiar to the local foreign
environment. Some authors have endorsed such an interpretation 1
something that we can still control in America. .. ").
Senator Jackson noted on the same day of closing debates:
The needs and aspirations of future generations make it our duty to build a sound
and operable foundation of national objectives for the management of our resources for our children and their children. The future of succeeding generations
in this country is in our hands.

115 CONG. REC. 40417 (1969) (emphasis added).
57. 115 CONG. REc. 3705 (1969) (Report).

58. Id.
59. SENATE COMM.

ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS

& HOUSE

COMM. ON SCIENCE AND

ASTRONAUTICS, CONGRESSIONAL WHITE PAPER ON A NATIONAL POLICY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT,

91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) [hereinafter cited as CONGRESSIONAL WHrTE PAPER], introduced
into the Congressional Record by Senator Jackson, 115 CONG. REc. 29078, 29082 (1969).
60. 115 CONG. REC. 3705 (1969).
61. See, e.g., Note, supra note 10, at 360, 363-64.
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despite the strong emphasis on "managing" the environment found
throughout the legislative history. Moreover, this expansive interpretation of NEPA's EIS mandate overlooks the cautious language
used in the transnational environmental context (i.e., Section 102
(2)(E)), language that manifests Congress' appreciation of the
practical and political limitations to full extension of United States
environmental policy abroad. These same political sensitivities and
practical limitations also provide, in part, the foundation for the
general legal presumption against extraterritorial application of
United States laws.62
For example, even though Congress recognized that "the
global character" of the environment had to "be the guide for domestic activities,"6 3 it also noted that United States policy would
"be limited outside [our] borders."'" Some commentators, supporting the transnational application of the EIS requirement, have
pointed to the broad statement of policy during the final debates,
that the United States government would not "initiate actions
which endanger the continued existence or the health of mankind. . . . [W]e will not intentionally initiate actions which will do
irreparable damage to the air, land and water which support life on
earth."6 5 However, during congressional debate, Senator Jackson
directed his remarks to the specific issue of protecting the international environment. He emphasized that Section 102(2)(E) was
crucial to the statute, noting: "Cooperation is also possible because
the problems of the environment, do not, for the most part, raise
questions related to ideology, national security, and the balance of
world power."6 6 Senator Jackson considered international environmental cooperation an attainable legislative goal since cooperation
was divorced from the ideological confrontation so typical of foreign relations. His observation reinforces the notion that Section
102(2)(C)'s EIS requirement should be subject to the foreign policy
caveat found in Section 102(2)(E). 7 It would seem indisputable
62.
63.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW,
CONGRESSIONAL WHITE PAPER,

supra note 45.

supra note 59.

64. Id.
65. See Note, supra note 10, at 370, relying on Senator Jackson's statements, 115
CONG. REC.

40416 (1969).

66. 115 CONG. REC. 40417 (1969).

67. As noted below, the courts have been reluctant to compromise NEPA's EIS requirement where purely United States national interests were at stake. See cases cited infra note
174. Yet, these cases are factually distinguishable from instances where foreign sovereign
interests are also involved. Moreover, the argument is not so much for the total exclusion of
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that unilateral U.S. application of the EIS requirement into a foreign sovereign's national developmental projects would entail a
more serious risk of diplomatic conflict and ideological confrontation than would the international cooperative endeavors of Section
102(2)(E). e8
It must be remembered that Section 102(2)(E) was formulated
during the conference committee sessions. In explaining the purpose of this new provision in NEPA, Senator Jackson stated that it

would:
give statutory authority to all Federal agencies to participate in
the development of a positive, forward looking program of international cooperation in dealing with the environmental problems
all nations and all people share.
We must seek solutions to environmental problems on an international level because they are internationalin originand scope.
The earth is a common resource, and cooperative effort will be
necessary to protect it. Perhaps also, in the common cause of environmental management, the nations of the earth will find a little more sympathy and understanding for one another.6 9
The clear inference is that United States activities which affect
foreign environmental and developmental interests should be the

subject of bilateral analysis and cooperation when consistent with
United States foreign policy interests.

Other statements tangential to the core debate can be found
in the legislative history.70 One commentator examined the House
transnational environmental problems from NEPA's EIS requirement; rather, the intent of
the Congress may have been only to ensure that environmental protection procedures under
NEPA were responsive to the difficulties that attend the transnational application of United
States law to activities that either affect other nations or in which foreign governments have
a legitimate and compelling interest.
68. See, Memorandum from Louis v. Nosenzo, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, to
James J. Shea, Director, Office of International Programs, Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(May 31, 1977), (unpublished).
69. 115 CoNG. REC. 40416-17 (1969) (emphasis added).
70. See, e.g., the testimony of Dr. Lynton K. Caldwell:
[A]Ithough our immediate concern is with environmental policy in America, that
policy must permit our nation to play a constructive role in international efforts to
safeguard the biosphere for the whole earth.
National Environmental Policy Act: Hearings on S. 1075, S. 237, and S. 1752, Before the
Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1969).
See also, Statement of Margaret Mead, who noted that United States exports of pesticides could cause potential environmental damage to other coufitries. Hearings on H.R.
6750, H.R. 11886, H.R. 11942, H.R. 12077, H.R. 12180, H.R. 12209, H.R. 12228, H.R. 12264,
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Report on the establishment of the Council of Environmental
Quality (CEQ) and concluded that statements therein "directly
support the interpretation that Congress intended Section
102(2)(C) to be applied to federal activities worldwide. ' 71 The conclusion, however, is far from sound given the legislative history of
NEPA itself and the statements bearing directly on international
environmental protection through cooperation. This House Report
was limited to the issue of CEQ's reporting functions and did not
address the substantive or procedural obligations under NEPA's
Section 102. Furthermore, contrary to other interpretations,72
statements made by the State Department regarding the wisdom
of Section 102(2)(E) are consistent with the Department's continued opposition to unilateral EIS analysis of foreign situs environmental impacts. 3
Finally, the Department of State seemingly posed the question
of NEPA's extraterritorial application to a congressional oversight
committee a year after the enactment of NEPA. During these
NEPA oversight hearings, the Department enunciated its view that
the EIS requirement should not apply to federal actions taken
H.R. 12409, Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation of the House
Comm. on Merchant Marine Fisheries,91st Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1969).
Note also, that S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 18, stated that "the Federal
Government must take care to avoid degradation and misuse of resources, risk to man's
continual health and safety.... Important decisions concerning the use and shape of
man's future environment continue to be made in small but steady increments which perpetrate rather than avoid the recognized mistakes of previous decades .... As a nation and as
a world, we face these conditions. ..."
71. See Note, supra note 10, at 369. The Report Stated:
It is an unfortunate fact that many and perhaps most forms of environmental
pollution cross international boundaries as easily as they cross State lines....
The international aspects are clearly a major part of the questions which the
Council [on Environmental Quality] will have to confront. ...
[I]mplicit in this section [dealing with CEQ reports to the President] is the understanding that the international implications of our current activities will also be
considered, inseparable as they are from the purely national consequences of our
actions.
H.R. REP. No. 378, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 7, 9 (1969).
72. See Note, supra note 10, at 367.
73. The Department of State presented its view during the Senate hearings on S. 1075:
"The solution of the environmental problem being a matter of national interest as well as
international concern, U.S. participation in bilateral and multilateral programs dealing with
the international aspects of the problem must be recognized as a vital part of U.S. policy to
cope with environmental problems." Hearingson S. 1075, S. 237, and S. 1752, Before the
Senate Comm. on Interiorand InsularAffairs, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1969) (Testimony of
Ass't Sec'y of State for Congressional Relations, William J. Macomber).
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wholly within the jurisdiction of another country. 74 The Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation rejected this position, saying that, "The history of the Act makes it quite clear that
the global effects of environmental decisions are inevitably a part
of the decision-making process and must be considered in that
context."75
As a matter of technical legislative interpretation, the pronouncements of the oversight committee are not appropriate material for determining Congress' prior intent regarding the application of NEPA abroad.7 Furthermore, in responding to the State
Department, the Subcommittee did not specify those sections of
the statute or legislative history supporting its conclusion.
More importantly, however, the State Department's position
and the Subcommittee's response, do not address the specific question of applying NEPA's EIS mandate to foreign local environmental impacts. The State Department's position could be interpreted
as asserting a broad EIS exemption for United States actions in
foreign territories. Given the intent of Congress to maximize the
protection afforded to the United States environment, it would be
indefensible to assert that the locus of federal activity (i.e. in a
foreign territory) should exempt that agency from NEPA's mandate despite significant effects within the United States.7 7 Moreover, the Subcommittee's response that "global effects" were a part
of the decision-making process under NEPA misses the question of
foreign environmental impacts. The Subcommittee's answer suffers
from the same lack of precision in defining "transnational impacts" that is endemic to the legal literature and judicial decisions
to date.
74. See Oversight Hearings, supra note 3, at 546-47.
75. H.R. REP. No. 316, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 6, 33 (1971).
76. Statements of legislative intent made after the enactment of the subject legislation
do not constitute a reliable source of congressional purpose or intent. "[P]ost-passage remarks of legislators, however explicit, cannot serve to change the legislative intent of Congress expressed before the Act's passage." Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S.
102, 132 (1974) relying upon United States v. Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 282
(1947), and National Woodwork Manufacturers Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 639 n.34
(1967).
77. This is particularly true in light of a long line of United States judicial decisions
that have upheld the extraterritorial application of United States laws to activities of citizens abroad but having an effect in the United States. The most prominent example of this
extraterritorial application is the area of United States and antitrust law. See, e.g., United
States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927); United States v. Aluminum Company of
America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1946); United States v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing
Co., 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950).
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In sum, the legislative history of NEPA demonstrates that
Congress' primary concern was protecting the United States environment while factoring indigenous environmental values into the
United States decision-making process; the effort was characterized as one of managing the United States environment and natural resources. At the international or transnational level, cooperation with other nations was to be the linchpin of NEPA procedure.
Congress was cautious about the potential foreign policy repercussions of United States environmental policy, and for the most part
assumed that environmental protection efforts would not and
should not clause diplomatic conflicts.
Thus, contrary to those who would argue for the full application of, and sole reliance upon, Section 102(2)(C)'s EIS requirement in the transnational context, this author submits that environmental protection procedures were meant to vary in accordance
with the circumstances of each environmental problem confronting
federal officials. Although legislative debates show that Congress
was aware of the transnational character of the environment, it
does not necessarily follow that a unilateral remedy particularly
suited for United States domestic environmental impacts and
problems, i.e., the EIS requirement, was intended to be the principal procedure applied to the entire panoply of environmental issues or problems outside U.S. borders. Rather, cooperation pursuant to Section 102(2)(E) would be the most effective method of
protecting foreign local environs in a manner consistent with both
United States and foreign objectives.
The analysis now turns to the decisions of the United States
judiciary and administrative agencies in the transnational NEPA
arena. If anything, these decisions reflect cautious uncertainty
among the courts regarding the scope of NEPA's EIS requirement.
Nevertheless, these decisions evidence some of the concerns militating against a broad interpretation of Section 102(2)(C)'s EIS
requirement.
C. Judicial Decisions Applying NEPA in the Transnational Context
In National Organizationfor the Reform of the Marijuana
Laws v. Dept. of State, the district court stated, "The extraterrito-
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riality of NEPA remains an open question in this circuit."" s Judicial decisions examining the transnational reach of NEPA have
been few and far between. Some commentators have read these decisions to support the notion that purely foreign local environmental impacts fall within the scope of NEPA's EIS requirement.7 9
However, none of the reported decisions mention, much less discuss, the ramifications of such an interpretation. This dearth of detailed analysis is not surprising since in each case an independent
jurisdictional element has afforded the court an opportunity to resolve the dispute without addressing the transnational NEPA
issue. 0
The first case to examine the application of NEPA beyond
United States borders was the District of Columbia Circuit Court
of Appeals decision in Wilderness Society v. Morton.81 The question presented to the court was whether Canadian citizens, not resident in the United States, could intervene in a litigation testing
the adequacy of an EIS prepared for the proposed construction of
the Trans-Alaskan Pipeline.2 Without extensive discussion, the
court permitted Canadian intervention because the alternative
route analysis contained in the challenged EIS raised the danger of
oil spills that could adversely affect Canadian interests. The holding implicitly supports the conclusion that foreign local environmental impacts should be examined in an EIS prepared in accordance with NEPA.
Further examination, however, reveals the fallacy of such a
broad interpretation. Regardless of the route finally chosen for the
pipeline, an impact statement was already required because the
project had a readily discernible environmental impact in United
States territory.83 Thus, the case is immediately distinguishable
from those projects causing foreign local environmental impacts
78. 452 F. Supp. 1226, 1232 (D.D.C. 1978).
79. See generally Robinson supra note 10; Note, supra note 10.
80. Among the jurisdictional "pegs" apparent in these cases are: substantial United
States financial commitment to the project, usually of a continuing nature; physical impact
of the project upon the domestic territory of the United States; use of the project by either
the United States government or citizenry;, control or oversight of United States authorities
over the project or the territory where the action will occur.
81. 463 F.2d 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
82. The issue for appellate review was whether the applicants for intervention had interests that were sufficiently antagonistic to, or different from, the interests of United States
environmental plaintiffs so as to render representation by American counsel inadequate.
83. In fact, domestic environmental groups had already obtained an injunction requiring preparation of an EIS.
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alone, such as an individual nuclear reactor export. The Wilderness Society decision only addressed the proper scope of an EIS
once an independent, "United States-impact" basis for the EIS
existed, despite the existence of incidental foreign local environmental impacts."4 Thus, the Wilderness Society holding may more
precisely be read as follows: once potential United States impacts
require an EIS, all feasible alternatives to a proposed action, and
the environmental impacts associated with them, must be
examined. 5
Wilderness Society also presented an instance where foreign
(i.e., Canadian) environmental interests were juxtaposed, through
the proposed route alternatives, to United States interests. In such
circumstances, NEPA's EIS requirement would necessitate a discussion of foreign interests and environmental impacts in order to
obtain a complete analysis of United States alternatives and related impacts.86 It is noteworthy that the court explicitly discussed
Section 102(2)(D) which requires agencies to study "appropriate
alternatives to recommended courses of action in any proposal
which involves conflicts concerning alternative uses of available resources. 8 7 Again, it must be remembered that the decision only
addressed the question of the proper scope of an EIS once the existence of United States domestic impacts and alternatives brought
8
the proposed action within the ambit of Section 102(2)(C)."
84. In this case, the court allowed foreign parties to participate in a challenge to United
States alternatives that had foreign impacts. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4332(2)(C)(iii) and (E).
85. The court's decision to allow Canadian environmentalists to intervene did not consider any of the possible adverse foreign policy repercussions from such intervention. In all
likelihood, the court's decision was welcomed by the Canadian governments, inasmuch as it
afforded additional protection to the Canadian environment and foreign governmental interests. Nonetheless, a decision that would extend NEPA's EIS requirement to foreign environmental impacts, in a manner that would delay or terminate a proposed United States action
upon which the foreign government was relying, would involve delicate questions of foreign
policy and United States relations with the recipient country. See, e.g., National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws v. United States Dep't of State, 452 F. Supp. 1226,
1232 (D.D.C. 1978).
86. Since United States environmental impacts were intimately connected (through the
discussion of route alternatives) to Canadian environmental interests, the discussion of
these foreign impacts was necessary to a proper examination of United States alternatives
and potential impacts on the United States.
87. Wilderness Society v. Morton, 463 F.2d at 1262.
88. One author has suggested that "under general principles of international law, the
United States has a duty to manage activities within its territorial boundaries [presumably
in this case, the construction of the pipeline] so as not to cause damage to the environment
of adjoining countries. Allowing intervention might be regarded merely as a means of recognizing and enforcing that duty." Tarlock, supra note 10, at 465.
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The same nexus between United States environmental impacts, alternative proposals, and foreign local environmental impacts does not exist in cases involving purely foreign local impacts
and foreign governmental interests or alternatives. Moreover,
United States control over, and use of, the proposed project (as in
the Trans-Alaskan Pipeline case) will not necessarily exist in all
transnational NEPA cases. For example, United States control or
use of an exported nuclear reactor that becomes the property of a
foreign entity is minimal, if not nonexistent.89 In light of the Wilderness Society decision, it is apparent that a decision to export a
nuclear reactor to a foreign government or utility would not involve "conflicts concerning alternative uses of available resources"
of the United States. Inasmuch as a conflict of foreign resource
usage rxists, it would be a matter of the recipient government's
concern and decision-making.90 Viewed from this perspective
Wilderness Society argues for the non-application of the EIS requirements requirement to foreign local environmental impacts associated with nuclear reactor exports.
In People of Enewetak v. Laird1 a group of plaintiffs brought
an action to enjoin a simulated nuclear test in the Pacific Trust
Territory of Enewetak atoll, alleging that the EIS was inadequate.
The court found NEPA to be applicable, but avoided the issue of
NEPA's transnational application. 2 While acknowledging that
"the sweep of NEPA is extraordinarily broad, compelling consider89. One commentator has alluded to this distinction in his discussion of the NEPA
cases involving international activities:
Even if the Wilderness Society holding is construed as recognizing that "NEPA
provides foreign nationals with certain rights when their environment is endangered by federal actions," such a principal [sic] would seem to be limited to cases
in which the environment of a foreign country is threatened with damage by activities solely under the control of a U.S. government agency.
Tarlock, supra note 10, at 465.
90. For example, in the NRC's Edlow decision, the Commission noted:
[E]lementary principles of comity among nations suggest that [the Commission]
stay [its] hand until these matters have been raised with the Government of India,
which obviously has the primary, if not exclusive, authority to regulate [the nuclear reactor operation in India].
In re Edlow Int'l Co., 3 N.R.C. at 575. See also, In re Babcock & Wilcox, 5 N.R.C. at 1344,
1346.
91. 353 F. Supp. 811 (D. Hi. 1973).
92. In fact, the court explicitly noted that the plaintiffs had argued that NEPA is applicable everywhere in the world where an agency takes action that would significantly affect
the quality of the human environment. The court responded, "In accordance with the view
of the case taken by this court, it is unnecessary to decide this question." 353 F. Supp. at
817, n.10 (D. Hi. 1973).
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ations of any and all types of environmental impact of federal action," 3 the court nevertheless examined the legislative history of
NEPA and held "it is reasonable to conclude that Congress intended NEPA to apply in all areas under its exclusive control."'"

The court conspicuously noted that "In areas like the Trust Territory there is little, if any, need for concern about the conflicts with
United States foreign policy or the balance of world power."9 5

Thus, the district court was impliedly reading the foreign policy
caveat found in Section 102(2)(E) into the EIS requirement of Section 102(2)(C).
In this same year, the Sierra Club brought an action against
93. Id. at 817.
94. Id. at 818. [Emphasis added.] The court went on to note that there was little decisional authority pertinent to the issue of NEPA's application to Trust Territories, but cited
the Wilderness Society decision for the apparent holding that foreign nationals have certain
rights when their environment is endangered by United States government actions. However, the court did not explain what those rights might encompass. Curiously, the court took
pains to state that "Even if Wilderness Society is limited or disavowed by subsequent decisions, the argument that Congress intended NEPA to apply to the Trust Territory remains
viable." Id. The court apparently harbored some suspicion regarding the continuing vitality
of the Wilderness Society decision.
95. Id. The court's language leads one to suspect that where environmental impacts
occur in foreign territories and outside the control of the Congress, or where extension of
NEPA could compromise foreign policy objectives, an EIS may not be required. The underlying concern appears to be with the possibility that environmental impacts associated with
a major project will go either unexamined, or will be imposed upon a territory and people
without consent.
The court also discussed the use of the term "Nation" in NEPA and specifically held
that "Nation" includes United States trust territories for the purpose of applying NEPA to
federal activities. Id. at 819. In light of subsequent decisions holding that trust territories
are not foreign nations (see Saipan v. Dep't of the Interior, 356 F. Supp. 645, 655 (D. Hi.
1973); Thompson v. Kleppe, 424 F. Supp. 1263, 1267 (D. Hi. 1976)), the Enewetak decision
is legally consistent, and adds little support, if any, to the extension of NEPA's EIS requirement to foreign local environmental impacts. In fact, the Enewetak court expressly noted
that one compelling reason for applying NEPA to the trust territory was that the territory
did not have an independent government that could protect its inhabitants from United
States activities adversely affecting their environment. 353 F. Supp. at 818 (D. Hi. 1973).
At this point, it may be appropriate to mention that in the NRC Babcock & Wilcox
decision, the Commission specifically noted that the government of the Federal Republic of
Germany had already conducted a hearing allowing the foreign petitioners to present their
challenge to the construction of the Malheim-Krlich Nuclear Power Station in Essen, West
Germany. Therefore, the interests of the German environmentalists had presumably received the appropriate attention and consideration under German legal process. The NRC
refused to second-guess the sovereign decision of the German environmental authorities. In
re Babcock & Wilcox, 5 N.R.C. at 1349.
As a final point to further distinguish the Enewetak decision from cases involving foreign local environmental impacts, the court pointed out that the United States was under an
international obligation to apply the protections of United States laws to the inhabitants of
the Enewetak Atoll. 353 F. Supp. at 819.
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the Atomic Energy Commission to obtain compliance with NEPA
EIS obligations in the area of nuclear power exports.9 6 The AEC
agreed to prepare an EIS on the overall nuclear power export program, which was eventually completed by ERDA in 1976 after the
enactment of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974. 9' This concession permitted the court to avoid the issue of applying NEPA's
EIS requirement to each nuclear reactor export, as well as the
question of whether the EIS requirement encompassed foreign local environmental impacts. As noted earlier, the generic EIS prepared by ERDA did not include an assessment of foreign local environmental impacts, but did discuss the global impacts of the
entire United States nuclear power export program.98
Perhaps the most comprehensive litigation occurred in 1975
when the Sierra Club obtained an injunction compelling the Federal Highway Administration to prepare an environmental impact
statement on the construction. of the Pan-American Highway
through the Darien Gap in Panama and Columbia. In Sierra Club
v. Coleman "I",9 the district court found that the FHWA's "Environmental Impact Assessment" violated NEPA since it had not
been circulated for comment, failed to discuss adequately the potential impact of the completed highway on the United States
(through the transmission of aftosa to United States cattle), and
failed to discuss adequately the impacts of alternative routes in
Central America. The court also held that the environmental impact statement should discuss the purely foreign impacts of alternative routes on the Choco and Cuna Indians who lived in the area
of the proposed construction. Eleven months later the FHWA returned with a final statement which the court again found to be
inadequate. 100 The court stated: "The second fundamental deficiency in the EIS is its treatment of the impact of the project upon
the lives of the Cuna and Choco Indians living in the Darien Gap
region."' 011 The court recommended that an anthropological and
ethnographic analysis of the highway construction would be appropriate, stating: "In preparing such a supplement to the EIS, defendants may conduct any on-site studies that may be required to al96. Sierra Club v. AEC, 4 Envt'l L. Rep. 20685 (D.D.C. 1974).
97. See ERDA-1542, supra note 12.
98. See text accompanying notes 12-13 supra.
99. 405 F. Supp. 53 (D.D.C. 1975).
100. Sierra Club v. Coleman "H," 421 F. Supp. 63 (D.D.C. 1976).
101. Id. at 66.
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low full and informed consideration of the issues involved."' 2
On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the lower court finding that the EIS was inadequate. 103 The court however, explicitly
declined to address the question of NEPA's extraterritorial application to foreign local environmental impacts.'"
Although the reversal by the court of appeals vitiates any
precedential value of the lower court decisions, the course of the
Darien Gap litigation provides an additional source of legal analysis pertinent to the question of NEPA's transnational application.
The lower court decisions could be construed as requiring full EIS
analysis of foreign local environmental impacts for all major federal actions. However, as in the Wilderness Society litigation, Darien Gap did not present the specific issue of applying the EIS
requirement to federal actions that have purely foreign local environmental impacts with no concomitant United States domestic
impact. The proposed highway construction required an EIS in the
first instance because of its potentially devastating impact on
United States domestic livestock through the transmission of hoof
and mouth disease from Central America to the Central Plains region of the United States. Darien Gap graphically illustrates two
critical aspects of major federal action that will favor the application of the EIS requirement to foreign local environmental impacts. These two elements are the degree of "control" over the federal action and the extent of environmental "interdependence"
arising from the federal action. By way of background, the United
States provided two-thirds of the financing for the Pan-American
highway construction. Therefore, local route decisions might very
well have turned on the extent of United States funding made
available for the Darien Gap project. Because of its financial responsibility for the highway construction, the United States government retained substantial control over the Darien Gap project;
environmental information and analysis of local impacts could
readily be used by the United States officials in reaching a routing
decision. Since the highway construction and route decisions involved significant United States impacts, as well as Central Ameri102. Id. at 68. There was no discussion as to whether such on-site studies were acceptable to the foreign governments involved.
103. Sierra Club v. Adams, 578 F.2d 389 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
104. Id. at 391-92 n.14. The court, however, did address defendant-appellants' argument that a less-than-thorough discussion of the environmental impact upon the Indians
was permissible since the Indians represented a small fraction of the Panamanian population. The court rejected this proposition. Id. at 396.
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can impacts within United States control, the case fell within the
Wilderness Society rationale. Sections 102(2)(C)(iii) and (D) require consideration of feasible alternatives and attendant environmental impacts for major federal actions directly affecting the
United States environment.
Furthermore, the United States government and public had a
substantial "use" interest in the completed highway. A considerable amount of United States and foreign commerce could be expected along the highway, moving both into and out of the territorial United States. The Darien Gap construction was part of a
larger inter-continental highway system that physically linked the
United States and foreign territory. This physical and commercial
connection created a certain degree of "interdependence" of environmental interests. The Darien Gap decision highlighted one of
the most vivid examples of this interdependence-the potential for
transmitting hoof and mouth disease to United States cattle. In
such circumstances, foreign environmental impacts and factors become de facto United States domestic impacts.
These elements of "control" and "interdependence" will not
exist in all areas of international commerce. Unlike those cases
where the United States government retains a substantial controlling interest in the day-to-day operation of a project, once a nuclear reactor is exported to another country the United States government surrenders control over the construction and operation of
the reactor. 10 5 Foreign local environmental impacts arising from

nuclear reactor operations become, as a legal and practical matter,
attenuated from the actual export licensing process, particularly in
light of the absence of United States regulatory authority over the
daily operation of the reactor. A foreign government's regulatory
policies and industrialization objectives will largely determine the
potential environmental impact of a nuclear reactor. United States
officials cannot translate these policies and objectives into an environmental analysis without cooperation from foreign government
officials or experts. Nor can United States officials begin to examine how these policies and objectives may change in the future,
105. As the NRC noted in its Babcock & Wilcox decision once an export is approved,
the United States government loses control of the project and the foreign government assumes responsibility for the construction and operation of the nuclear reactor, pursuant to
certain recommended guidelines promulgated by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
The only continuing control exercised by the United States stems from our non-proliferation conditions imposed on the recipient government by the appropriate agreement for cooperation. In re Babcock & Wilcox, 5 N.R.C. at 1343.
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as foreign governmental agencies or officials adjust environmental

and developmental objectives. A United States EIS unilaterally
prepared under such constraints may suffer from a lack of environ-

10
mental probative value. 6

The second element in Darien Gap--"the interdependence of
impacts"-also is absent in the area of nuclear reactor exports. For
the most part, the environmental affects of operating a nuclear reactor will be confined to local foreign environs. Moreover, the

United States government has already prepared an EIS for the entire nuclear export program, examining its total effect on the

United States as well as the global commons. 107 There may be,
however, instances where the location of the exported reactor could
create such interdependence as to require an individual EIS before
authorizing the export. 10 8 The existence of such a possibility argues
for a flexible approach in applying NEPA where foreign and domestic environmental impacts may be coincident.
Other practical considerations argue against the extension of
the EIS requirements to foreign local environmental impacts. First,
NEPA imposes substantial investigatory and regulatory duties on
106. On this point, it is interesting to highlight the course of events in the Darien Gap
litigation, notes 99-103 supra. In the district court, Judge Bryant found the assessment of
impacts on the local Indian tribes of Panama and Colombia to be inadequate, lacking sufficient detail and evaluation. Coleman IT,421 F. Supp. 63, 66 (D.D.C. 1976). However, the
court of appeals upheld the EIS, including the rather sketchy examination of the impact on
the Indian tribes. The court noted:
While there certainly will be a degree of cultural disruption on the Indians, the
precise extent of this disruption is apparently subject to a wide variety of interpretations. Because the decision-maker was presented with the entire range of
these interpretations, in sufficient detail to allow him to balance the appropriate
environmental factors, we believe NEPA's requirements have been met.
Sierra Club v. Adams, 578 F.2d 389, 396 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
The court of appeals apparently disagreed with the district court's assessment of the
fact-finding and analytical duties of defendants in assessing the foreign impacts. Perhaps
underlying the difference of opinion is an awareness of the inability of United States officials to gather information on foreign impacts; this would indicate a pragmatic approach to
the scope of the EIS duty to be imposed on United States officials.
Similarly, in Babcock & Wilcox, the NRC alluded to the problem of causation and relevancy of the EIS for foreign environmental impacts, stating: "The more attenuated the impacts on the United States become, however, the less clearly Section 102(2)(C) applies." In
re Babcock & Wilcox, 5 N.R.C. at 1339.
107. See ERDA-1542, supra note 12.
108. For example, one might posit that if the United States were to export a nuclear
reactor to Mexico to be located near the United States-Mexican border, there may be good
reason for an EIS to examine the foreign local environmental impacts inasmuch as they
could easily "spill over" into the United States environs, and therefore, be United States
impacts properly warranting a domestic EIS analysis.
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agency officials. Officials must assess the environmental impact of a

proposed action, delineate irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources, identify alternatives, and balance the costs and
benefits of the proposed activity and feasible alternatives.10 Balancing costs and benefits involves intimate knowledge of social values; it requires voluminous research, a tedious weighing of governmental policies and developmental objectives, and a realistic
assessment of alternatives.110 An attempt to acquire sufficient information to perform this type of analysis of foreign local environ-

mental impacts would necessarily involve United States officials in
the internal affairs of a foreign government, its regulatory process,
109. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976). Clearly, premature analysis (in terms of timely and
available information) of the environmental effect of a project is not contemplated by
NEPA. In Flint Ridge Development Co. v. Scenic Rivers Assoc., 426 U.S. 776, 791 n.13
(1976), the Supreme Court responded to the suggestion of the court of appeals that "a developer would give advance notice to HUD of its intent to sell land in interstate commerce,
whereby HUD could commence the preparation of its impact statement [in order to comply
with its own thirty-day permit issuance requirement]." The Supreme Court stated:
This suggestion would still not allow compliance with the 30-day rule. The agency
could not fruitfully begin the impact statement until the developer's plans were
fully or largely worked out-at which time the developer would be virtually ready
to file his disclosure statement and begin sales. (emphasis added)
See also Coalition for Lower Beaufort County v. Alexander, 434 F. Supp. 293 (D.D.C. 197-7)
(where court upheld an EIS that addressed the immediate impacts of the proposed project,
but did not address ramifications that were not sufficiently concrete or ascertainable to be
anything but speculative). In Union of Concerned Scientists v. AEC, the court stated:
More to the point is the Commission's practical observation that consideration in
the FES of derating to an unknowable level as the result of then as yet unformulated criteria would have been speculative to the point of uselessness.
Clearly, the more appropriate time at which to reevaluate Pilgrim's cost-benefit ration would be when the new criteria are actually applied to the reactor.
Union of Concerned Scientists v. AEC, 499 F.2d 1069, 1084 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See also,
County of Suffolk v. Secretary of Interior, 562 F.2d 1368, 1378 (2d Cir. 1977).
110. See 1978 Hearings on Senate Resolution 49, supra note 5, at 7, 10 (testimony of
Robert C. Brewster):
The assessment of environmental impacts in other nations requires a collection of
detailed information on local conditions and other matters which would normally
be conducted by the governments of the affected nations.
Additionally, the mechanics of preparing an environmental assessment involving
detailed analyses of environmental, social, cultural, and other impacts could often
be incompatible with the speed, confidentiality, and flexibility necessary for effective diplomacy and the requirements of national security and commercial practices. Adequate assessment of environmental impacts on other nations requires as
well the collection of detailed information on local conditions (population, ecology,
meteorology, etc.), facility design, and other matters which would normally be
conducted by the governments of the affected nations.
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and the decisionmaking of local municipalities.111 Cooperation is
crucial to such an effort. Some degree of agency discretion also is
essential, for foreign governments may resist intensive United
States environmental review, particularly in the sensitive area of

commercial nuclear energy production and utilization.

2

Experi-

ence teaches, contrary to Senator Jackson's assumption, that ideological, political, and sociological factors are at the heart of the nuclear energy-environmental protection trade-off. Therefore, as a
matter of policy, the final decision on what constitutes an accept-

able environmental cost-benefit balance wholly within a foreign
territory should remain in the hands of the foreign government,

determined by the social values and developmental objectives that
are within the realm

of that government's

discretion

and

authority. 113
111. See text accompanying note 220 infra. See 1978 Hearings on Senate Resolution
49, supra note 5, at 10 (testimony of Robert C. Brewster), noting
While we concur in the desirability of developing procedures for international cooperation in the preparation of environmental assessments for particular international activities, we are also mindful that this is a field where nations can be extremely sensitive about preserving their rights to assert their own priorities and
make their own decisions. Whatever procedures we may work out must be mutually acceptable. Any other course could have an adverse effect on our relations
with affected countries and our overall foreign policy.
See also, Hearings on Senate Resolution 49 Before the Subcomm. on Arms Control,
Oceans, and InternationalEnvironment of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 1977 Hearings on Senate Resolution 49]
(testimony of Patsy Mink):
The reluctance of states to accept real or perceived restraints on their sovereignty
is reflected in the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, which sets
forth the sovereign right of nations to conduct their own environmental policies.
The issue goes right to the heart of national economic survival ....
The states of
Europe would be understandably reluctant to adopt any broad obligations which
could affect their right to continue the production of energy.
112. If such environmental reviews resulted in more litigation similar to the Balrgeraktion Atomschutz Mittelrhein petition to the NRC, note 36 supra, foreign nations may become even more reluctant to supply information for fear of fostering injurious litigation in
United States courts or administrative agencies.
113. This is not to advocate indifference to environmental impacts caused by national
activities that "spill-over" into other jurisdictions with detrimental consequences. NEPA
would require cooperative efforts to prevent this problem. Customary international law
might also require some form of accommodation of the affected nation's interests, or else

reparations. See 1 L.

OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW

(7th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1948) 259,

noting:
Thus fifthly, a State, in spite of its territorial supremacy, is not allowed to alter
the natural conditions of its own territory to the disadvantage of the natural conditions of the territory of a neighbouring State ....
Sixthly, a State is bound to
prevent such use of its territory as, having regard to the circumstances, is unduly
injurious to the inhabitants of the neighbouring State, e.g., as the result of work-
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The NRC has had two occasions to examine its environmental

11 4
obligations under NEPA in the nuclear export licensing process.

In each instance, the Commission presented its interpretation of
the NEPA EIS mandate with respect to foreign local environmental impacts associated with commercial nuclear exports. In both instances the Commission found that NEPA did not require an EIS
analysis of such impacts.
In Edlow, the NRC addressed the contention that foreign environmental impacts associated with a nuclear fuel shipment to India fell within the EIS mandate:
It is not for us to make policy decisions for another sovereign national on the social balance to be struck between energy needs
and environmental impacts....

[T]he terms and history of

[NEPA] are most consistent with an interpretation which avoids
speculation regarding another nation's internal affairs. Even if it
were assumed that international impacts [i.e. those on the global
commons] must be considered.., internal impacts to a foreign
nation need not be. 115
Similarly, in the Babcock & Wilcox decision, the Commission
examined the legislative history of NEPA and concluded that protecting the domestic environment of the United States was the
predominant concern of Congress. 1 It then noted that Section
ing or factories emitting deleterious fumes.

This treatise also cites to the Trail Smelter Arbitral Tribunal decision of April 16, 1938,
finding liability for damage caused by the smelter situated in Trail, British Columbia, to the
inhabitants of the State of Washington. See id. at 259, 313 n.6. In fact, the scope of this
article is so defined as to avoid a discussion of the admirable and ever-increasing international efforts to protect the global commons and individual nations from environmental pollution caused by unilateral national activities. See, e.g, Convention on the Protection of the
Environment, Feb. 19, 1974, 13 I.L.M. 591 (1974) reprinted in S. MCCAFFREY, PRIVATE REMEDIES FOR TRANSFRONTIER ENVIRONMENTAL DISTURBANCES

152-56 (1975); Declaration of the

UN Conference on the Human Environment, June 16, 1972, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. .48/14, and
Corr. 1, 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972); Committee I Text of the Draft Law of the Sea Treaty,
March 31, 1977, art. 16, reprinted in 1977 Hearings on Senate Resolution 49, supra note
111, at 48; A. REST, CONVENTION ON COMPENSATION FOR TRANSFRONTIER ENVIRONMENTAL
INJURiES (1976).

114. See In re Edlow Int'l Co., 3 N.R.C. at 563; In re Babcock & Wilcox, 5 N.R.C. at
1331.
115. In re Edlow Int'l Co., 3 N.R.C. at 585. The commission also decided that a nuclear
fuel export is not a "major federal action" falling within the scope of NEPA. This determination appears to have received Executive Branch approval in Executive Order 12114 and
the Unified Procedures pursuant to the Order, discussed at notes 206-210, 216 infra. Apparently, all nuclear reactor exports would be considered major federal actions for the purpose
of applying NEPA.
116. In re Babcock & Wilcox, 5 N.R.C. at 1340.
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102(2)(F) indicated that Congress was sensitive to foreign policy
concerns when it directly faced international implications. '117 The
Commission then observed:
In the face of the indisputable proposition that EIS preparation
for such site-specific impacts could have major foreign policy
ramifications . .. the absence of a foreign policy qualification
from Section 102(2)(C) can only signify that Congress did not

contemplate that such impacts were to be addressed in the environmental statements required by that section. 118
Fundamental to these decisions was the Commission's belief that
established principles of international law conflicted with the expansive reading of NEPA urged by petitioners.""' It should be
noted that the legal significance of these NRC decisions is by no
means dispositive from a jurisprudential viewpoint. The NRC position, although articulating some of the policy considerations pertinent to the nuclear export field, clashes with the position of the
CEQ, the federal agency charged with the supervision and implementation of NEPA. Which of these two agencies' positions should
be given primary weight1 20 is a difficult question since both agencies have a particular expertise and political acumen relevant to
the issue of environmental responsibility in the nuclear export licensing process.
At this point, the analysis returns to the specific area of nuclear exports, moving from the strict legal analysis of NEPA to the
legal and foreign political considerations inherent in contemporary
United States nuclear export policy. The following discussion will
also provide a convenient springboard for further examination of
the international political and legal concerns that should inform
any analysis of extending United States laws into foreign
117. Id. at 1339.
118. Id.
119. The Commission relied upon Article 1H(G) of the Agreement for Cooperation Between the United States and India, August 8, 1963, T.I.A.S. 5446, to support its position
regarding the Indian government's lead responsibility for environmental, health, and safety
aspects of the Tarapur reactor. The opinion concluded that "it would be extraordinary, as a
matter of international law, to conclude that we had authority to address ourselves to, or
attempt to regulate, matters so clearly domestic to the Indian nation and within the purview
of its own regulatory responsibilities." In re Edlow Int'l Co., 3 N.R.C. at 582.
120. Various Supreme Court decisions establish the principle that the interpretive decisions of adminstrative agencies charged with supervising and administering a statutory regulatory scheme are to be given great deference. See, e.g., United States v. Chicago, 400 U.S.
8 (1970); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S.
1 (1965).
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jurisdiction.

IV. A NEW POLICY EMERGES: THE NUCLEAR
NON-PROLIFERATION ACT OF 1978
A. Introduction-The Political and Pragmatic Context.
As the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act is introduced, it may be
helpful to conceptualize the ensuing statutory and foreign policy
analysis as a concurrent body of law juxtaposed to the body of environmental law and policy we have just left. These two bodies of
law, and the policies that underlie them, are in some ways at loggerheads. The collision of these policies has largely been overlooked by the legal literature to date; and yet, it is this collision
that has led to continued bureaucratic paralysis over the problem
of applying NEPA's EIS requirement to nuclear reactor exports
and foreign local environmental impacts.
In the months and years following the Indian peaceful nuclear
test explosion of 1974,121 the United States government, as well as

governments around the world, became much more concerned with
the problem of nuclear weapons proliferation. In the United
States, President Ford and then democratic Presidential candidate, Jimmy Carter, made nuclear proliferation a campaign issue
in the 1976 election. 122 After his election to office, President Carter
continued a strong stance toward the threat of nuclear weapons
proliferation and the consequences of nuclear warfare and
terrorism.123
121. India detonated a peaceful nuclear device below the surface of the Rajasthan Desert on May 18, 1974.
122. In his October 28, 1976 campaign statement President Gerald Ford incorporated
the issue of nuclear weapons proliferation into his election campaign and outlined his administration's position on the problem and a possible solution. The President called for an
international cooperative effort to develop the benefits of nuclear energy, yet prevent the
spread of nuclear weapons. He also announced a series of major United States policy decisions to guide the course of future nuclear commerce between the United States and the rest
of the world. This statement is reprinted in 12 WEEKLY COMP. OF PREs. Doc. 1624-31 (1976).
See also, Kissinger, Address Before the United States Nations General Assembly on September 30, 1976, 75 DEPT. STATE BULL. 506-07 (1976). For a response by then democratic
candidate, Jimmy Carter, see Carter Vows a Curb on Nuclear Exports to Bar Arms Spread,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1976, at 1, col. 1.
123. For example, on April 7, 1977, President Carter announced that he was deferring
the United States development of breeder reactors in an attempt to slow down the development and spread of nuclear technology using dangerous plutonium fuels. He also announced
that he would seek establishment of an international program to develop alternative nuclear
fuel cycles so as to provide further protection against nuclear weapons proliferation. This
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At this time, it became apparent that the United States had
adopted a nuclear foreign policy which integrated United States
non-proliferation objectives with its commercial nuclear export
policy. In essence, the United States government believed that any
effort to prevent or slow down the spread of nuclear weapons
throughout the world would depend, to a large extent, on the continued presence of the United States as a major and reliable nuclear supplier. As a reliable supplier of commercial nuclear material and facilities, it would be possible for the United States
government to obtain some limited supervision over the use of
United States-supplied nuclear material and equipment through
binding international supply agreements (such as new agreements
for cooperation and specific licensing criteria). Moreover, as a condition for commercial nuclear exchange, the United States government could seek concessions from the recipient government that
other nuclear suppliers might not require. For example, the United
States could impose certain material accounting and inspection requirements in order to reduce the possibility that nuclear fuel
could be diverted to military research. (There are often described
as "safeguards requirements"). Or, the United States might suggest minimum levels of physical security at the nuclear facility to
which the fuel is exported (to prevent the theft of nuclear material); demand the return of spent nuclear fuel to the United States
for safe disposal (to prevent the unauthorized reprocessing of used
fuel into weapons-grade nuclear material); require the foreign government to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1969 or the
IAEA safeguards program (to allow international inspection of national commercial nuclear facilities). In this way, United States
commercial intercourse would be used to reduce the opportunity
for recipient nations to develop nuclear weapons.
As already noted, the AEA established a framework for nuclear export licensing that had as a threshold requirement the determination that the proposed export would not be "inimical to the
common defense and security" of the United States.124 The AEA,
however, contained no detailed criteria upon which United States
suppliers could rely for prompt exports; nor did it contain any speproposal has become a reality in the form of the INFCE-International Nuclear Fuel Cycle
Evaluation Program. 13 WEKLrY Comp. oF PREs. Doc. 502, 503 (1977). See generally, Nye,
Non-Proliferation:A long-term Strategy, 56 FORmGN AFFAmS 601 (1978). The author was a

member of President Carter's nuclear policy staff.
124. See text accompanying notes 22-30 supra.
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cific procedures that set forth deadlines for administrative action
on an export license application. The process of commercial nuclear export licensing become one of awkward bureaucratic procedure, substantial delay, and inconsistent application. This tended
to discourage other nations in their commercial nations to turn to
other nuclear suppliers or develop their own indigenous nuclear capabilities. 125 Thus, the existing licensing sheme and course of nuclear commerce did not serve United States non-proliferation
objectives under its contemporary nuclear foreign policy strategy.
In response to this problem, Congress enacted the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA), 12s and amended the AEA
by restructuring the framework and criteria for licensing nuclear
exports. The new legislation sets forth specific criteria to be employed by the NRC in making export licensing decisions, and establishes procedure and deadlines for making a licensing determination in a timely fashion. The new legislation also defines with
greater specificity the perspective roles of the State Department,
NRC, Congress and the President in the licensing process.
The concern for streamlining nuclear export procedures was
evident throughout the congressional debates and hearings on the
NNPA.1 27 Even the strong proponents of the non-proliferation legislation feared that the procedures contained in the 1977 draft legislation offered far too much opportunity for litigation and damaging delay in the licensing process. Senator James A. McClure, a
leading figure in the legislative initiative, stated during the 1977
debates:
[T]he procedural time, predictability, and litigation problems
contained in Title I and IV [the basic licensing provisions] may
be sufficient to deter agreement and commerce between other nations and the United States ....

If other nations, in fact, choose

to go elsewhere for their nuclear supplies, it will be difficult, if not
impossible, for the U.S. to play a leadership role in nuclear commerce and non-proliferation because its participation will become
increasingly limited.
125. For example, both Brazil and Pakistan concluded negotiations and contractual arrangements with the Federal Republic of Germany and France respectively, for the supply
of nuclear material, nuclear facilities, and sensitive technology. See Carter Vows Curb on
Nuclear Exports, supra note 122.
126. 22 U.S.C. §§ 3201-3282; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2160a (1979).
127. See, e.g., 123 CONG. REc. 10283 (1977) (remarks of Rep. Scheurer); 124 CONG. REC.

S1084, S1091 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1978) (remarks of Senators Baker and Domenici). See also
H.R. REP. No. 567, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-9 (1977).
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The resulting loss of exports could have serious and farreaching impacts of on U.S. policy initiatives in the non-prolifera-

tion area... Since the U.S. participation in that commerce is
absolutely essential for achievement of our non-proliferation
objectives, these two titles ultimately may frustrate the underlying motivations for this legislation.128
Similar concerns were articulated throughout the 1978 congres12 9
sional debates.
B. The Basic Structure of the NNPA
With the overriding purpose of facilitating United States nuclear export procedures, the NNPA clarified the nuclear export
policy rooted in the AEA and refined over the subsequent years.
For example, Section 304 of the NNPA established new procedures
for reviewing and expediting export license applications filed by
United States commercial nuclear suppliers. 0° Under these procedures, both the State Department and the NRC have a role to
play. First, the State Department makes a preliminary assessment
of the proposed export to determine whether the export would
jeopardize the common defense and security of the United
3 After an affirmative recommendation, the NRC gives
States. 81
"timely consideration" to the export license request using the established statutory criteria, and then can issue the license. According to the NNPA, "such requests shall be granted upon a determination that all applicable statutory requirements have been
met.,

13 2

Under the NNPA, the State Department can recommend issuing a license even if the specific statutory criteria are not met, so
128. S. REP.No. 467, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 93 (1977).
129. See, e.g., 124 CONG. Rac. S1084, S1091, supra note 127. See also debates discussed
in text accompanying notes 164-69 & 172 infra.
130. 42 U.S.C. § 2155 (1979).
131. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2155, 2112 (1979). In brief, the Commission must await the Secretary of State's judgment that the proposed export would not be inimical to the common
defense and security of the United States, although the Commission may begin its own review concurrent with the Secretary of State's effort to reach his conclusion. In reaching his
decision, the Secretary is authorized to "address the extent to which the export criteria then
in effect are met and the extent to which the cooperating party [i.e., recipient nation] has
adhered to the provisions of the applicable agreement for cooperation ... ." 42 U.S.C. §
2155(a)(1) (1979). The Secretary may also address other factors dealing with non-proliferation policy and objectives, as well as whether the recipient nation has complied with United
States statutory licensing criteria.
132. 42 U.S.C. § 2155(b)(1) (1979) (emphasis added).
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long as the Department determines that the proposed export is not
inimical to the common defense and security. 133 This procedure
comports with the Department's lead role in conducting United
States foreign policy; it recognizes that the Department should
have the authority, in unusual or critical cases, to recommend a
nuclear export for foreign policy reasons apart from strict statutory
criteria binding on the NRC. The Department's discretion, however, is circumscribed by the need for timely action; under normal
circumstances, it must issue its licensing recommendation within
sixty days of the license application. 13 '
Together with the procedural changes wrought by the NNPA,
Congress established specific licensing criteria to be used by the
NRC. Section 305 of the NNPA added a new Section 127 to the
AEA stating: "The United States adopts the following, criteria
which, in addition to other requirements of law will govern exports
Unlike
for peaceful nuclear uses from the United States ... ,,35s
the State Department, the NRC is bound under NNPA to determine whether a proposed export meets six specific licensing criteria; on that basis alone, the NRC must decide to issue an export
license,1 36 after the State Department has given its recommenda133. See 42 U.S.C. § 2155(a)(1) (1979). Perhaps here it would be appropriate to point
out that the Secretary of State, as the President's chief advisor on foreign policy, is permitted a considerable amount of discretion in coming to his conclusion on the appropriateness
of any particular nuclear export. Congress did not attempt to limit the functions of the
Secretary of State in the area of foreign policy and international relations. Environmental
considerations may enter into the foreign policy functions of the Secretary in certain circumstances, such as where environmental factors, either in the United States or the recipient nations, may directly affect United States non-proliferation or other foreign policy
objectives. The NNPA, although possibly construed as limiting the mandatory consideration
of environmental factors in the export licensing context, does not prohibit the discretionary
consideration of such factors. In fact, such was the case in the suit brought by Westinghouse, note 17 supra, where the ability of the Department of State to consider environmental, health and safety factors associated with the exported nuclear reactor was challenged.
For a general and thorough discussion of how the various responsibilities of the relevant
federal agencies are apportioned by the NNPA, what those responsibilities are, and the substantive content of the new statute, see Bettauer, The Nuclear Non-ProliferationAct of
1978, 10 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1105-80 (1978).
134. 42 U.S.C. § 2155(a)(1) (1979).
135. 42 U.S.C. § 2156 (1979). These licensing criteria deal with efforts to prevent the
use of exported material and facilities for weapons purposes. See summary of these criteria
at note 137 infra.
136. 42 U.S.C. § 2155(b)(1) (1979). Senator McClure, during the consideration of the
predecessor bill to the NNPA, introduced an amendment to Section 304 to delete language
that may have authorized the NRC to take into account other policy considerations in its
licensing determination. He explained that export license approval was to be
premised solely on the statutory criteria and requirements contained in § 304
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tion. These six criteria theoretically operate to reduce the likelihood that exported nuclear material and facilities will be used for
the development of nuclear weapons.17

Two points become apparent upon examining the licensing
procedures and criteria established by the NNPA. First, there is a
definite concern with assuring timely action on a license application. Second, there is no mention of environmental review in either
the licensing criteria or procedures.138 Each of these two points has
significance in a discussion of whether NEPA's EIS requirement
extends to foreign local environmental impacts associated with exported nuclear reactors.
If one reads the first point-congressional concern with quick
and expedited export licensing-in conjunction with established
judicial exceptions to NEPA requirements, the NNPA may mark
out an area of federal activity exempted from the NEPA EIS requirement. Examining the second point-the new licensing criteria
(with no mention of an environmental protection mandate) and
the relevant legislative history-the NNPA may establish a separate environmental protection procedure in the area of nuclear export licensing that comports with the NEPA cooperation requirement found in Section 102(2)(E) but which excludes the EIS
requirement found in Section 102(2)(C). Although this writing examines both points separately, they are closely related and should,
in the final analysis, be considered together for purposes of ascertaining the effect of the NNPA on the NEPA-nuclear export
....
This amendment also makes clear that the timely consideration required of
the NRC ... is intended to be based solely on the required findings, and not on
any other unrelated or administratively established requirement. Once the
statutory findings have been made, the license application shall be immediately
approved.
124 CONG. REC. 82451 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1978) (emphasis added). If the NRC is unable to
find that the statutory criteria are met, the President then has the authority to issue the
export subject to congressional review and veto.
137. The six licensing criteria can be summarized as: (1) will IAEA safeguards be applied to the exported material, previously exported material, or special nuclear material produced through the use of the exported material, (2) is there an assurance that the material
will not be used to develop any nuclear explosive device, (3) will adequate physical security
measures be implemented, (4) is there an agreement that no retransfer of the material will
occur without the consent of the United States government, (5) is there an assurance that
no reprocessing of exported material will occur without the consent of the United States
government, and (6) a general prohibition on the export of sensitive nuclear technology unless the foregoing conditions are applied to any facility or material under the jurisdiction of
the recipient nation. 42 U.S.C. § 2156 (1979).
138. As will be discussed below, the NNPA does contain a major environmental provision located in another section of the statute.
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debate.
C. The NNPA and Exempted Agency Activity Under
NEPA
According to current environmental jurisprudence, if a federal
agency's organic statute establishes strict time limitations for administrative action, or otherwise espouses purposes that unavoidably clash with NEPA obligations, NEPA must yield to the conflicting statutory scheme. 39 Under the rationale articulated in
Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. Atomic Energy
Commission,1 40 the procedural duties imposed by NEPA must be
complied with to the fullest extent possible unless there is a clear
conflict of statutory authority.1 4 1 Since the Calvert Cliffs' decision,
the courts have elaborated upon the "statutory conflict" exemption
to NEPA obligations.
For example, in Cohen v. Price Commission,1 42 an action was
brought to enjoin an order of the President's Price Commission authorizing an increase in New York subway fares. Plaintiffs argued
that the Commission was required to file an EIS before taking this
major action. The court held that the plaintiffs had not satisfied
the conditions for preliminary injunctive relief. In examining the
plaintiffs' probability of success on the merits, the court noted that
the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 (under which the Price
Commission was created and given authority to act) required
prompt judgments and action by the executive branch.
The President is in a position to implement promptly and effectively the program authorized by this Title.... There can be no
question that if the purposes of the Economic Stabilization Act
are to be achieved, the President or his delegated representatives
139. See, e.g., Texas Committee on Natural Resources v. Bergland, 573 F.2d 201 (5th
Cir. 1978), rehearingdenied, 576 F.2d 931 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 966 (1978);
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 367 F. Supp. 122 (E.D.
Tenn. 1973), opinion supplemented, 367 F. Supp. 128 (E.D. Tenn. 1978), afl'd, 502 F.2d 852
(6th Cir. 1974); cases cited in text accompanying notes 142, 145 infra.
140. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
141. Id. at 1114-15. See also Flint Ridge Development Co. v. Scenic Rivers Assoc., 426
U.S. 776, 788 (1976), where the Court noted:
Section 102 recognizes, however, that where a clear and unavoidable conflict in
statutory authority exists, NEPA must give way. As we noted in United States v.
SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 694 (1973), "NEPA was not intended to repeal by implication any other statute."
142. 337 F. Supp. 1236 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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must be free to act with promptness and dispatch.14

The court observed that the purposes of the Stabilization Act
indicated "a substantial question as to whether NEPA is applicable to the Price Commission... whose functions would be readily
defeated and frustrated by bureaucratic delays were it required [to
comply with NEPA]." 1 "
In 1974, the NEPA statutory conflict issue again found its way
into the courts. In Gulf Oil Corporation v. Simon, 14 5 the plaintiff
sought an injunction against the administrator of the Federal Energy Office to prevent enforcement of a regulation requiring Gulf
to sell its crude oil to competing refiners. Gulf argued that a NEPA
EIS was required before the regulation could be promulgated. The
court rejected the plaintiff's claim, adopting the approach utilized
in Cohen:
Section 4(a) of the Allocation Act obligated the FEO to promulgate mandatory oil allocation regulations within 15 days after the
emergency legislation's enactment .... Establishment of such a
deadline makes it abundantly clear that Congress had intended
the FEO administrator to proceed expeditiously. Compliance
with NEPA, on the other hand, would disarm the FEO of its ability and authority
to take necessary action with the required de146
gree of speed.

The court also pointed out that since Congress required immediate
action, "[T]he inherent tension between NEPA and the Allocation

Act... must be resolved on balance with a finding that the FEO
'147
was not required to draft an environmental impact statement.
Obviously, Gulf Oil involved a compelling conflict given the fifteen
day deadline established by the Allocation Act.

143. Id. at 1240 (emphasis added).
144. Id. at 1241. The court noted that the CEQ Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. 1500.11(b), provided that administrative action should not be taken until 90 days had lapsed from the date
that an impact statement was circulated. Although compliance with NEPA and the Guidelines was not factually impossible, the court found that such a delay would severely impair
the effectiveness of the Price Commission. Id. at 1242.
The court went on to emphasize other factors evidencing Congress' intent to free the
Price Commission from any hindrance in the discharge of its duties: the agency was not
permanent, only temporary; it was established to deal with the economic crisis; the Congress
exempted the Price Commission from the normal requirements and review process under
the Administrative Procedure Act; and the Stabilization Act limited the power of the courts
to issue injunctive relief against the Price Commission.
145. 373 F. Supp. 1102 (D.D.C. 1974).
146. Id. at 1104-05 (emphasis added).
147. Id. at 1105.
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While both Cohen and Gulf Oil involved temporary agencies
established by Congress to deal with emergency situations nothing
in these decisions limited the statutory conflict exemption to only
emergency legislation. To the contrary, Cohen intimated that even
if an irreconcilable conflict with NEPA did not exist on the face of
the statute (i.e., theoretical possibility of compliance could be
demonstrated), the courts would ascertain the legislative purposes
and agency functions in order to determine if the agency's primary
mission would be compromised by strict adherence to NEPA
obligations.14
This hypothesis was tested during the 1976 term of the Supreme Court. In Flint Ridge Development Co. v. Scenic Rivers Association of Oklahoma,1 49 the Supreme Court examined the NEPA
statutory conflict exemption in the context of ongoing HUD operations under the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act.1 50 Under
the Disclosure Act, any private real estate developer was required
to disclose certain information concerning a proposed subdivision
development; only after this "disclosure statement" became effective, could the proposed development begin.
The question presented to the Court was whether HUD had to
prepare an environmental impact statement before the disclosure
statement would be allowed to become effective. The latter became
effective automatically thirty days after filing, unless the Secretary
requested supplemental information or granted early approval.
Noting that the only statutory exception to the mandatory thirty
day effective date was a HUD determination that the statement
was incomplete, the Court held that NEPA's EIS requirement
must yield since it would result in a "clear and fundamental conflict" with the Disclosure Act if applied.1 51 The court reasoned that
to prepare, circulate, and revise an impact statement within thirty
days would be unfeasible.

52

148. See Tarlock, supra note 10, at 467-68. While agencies administering foreign grant
programs may not be able to claim that the imposition of NEPA duties would interfere with
their ability to act with all deliberate speed, Cohen and Gulf Oil do stand for the proposition that an agency can exempt itself by demonstrating that the blanket application of
NEPA would seriously interfere with its ability to carry out its primary mission.
149. See Flint Ridge Development Co. v. Scenic Rivers Assoc., 426 U.S. at 788.
150. 15 U.S.C. § 1701 (1974).
151. Flint Ridge Development Co. v. Scenic Rivers Assoc., 426 U.S. at 791.
152. Id. The Court noted: "The Secretary cannot comply with the statutory duty to
allow statements of record to go into effect within 30 days of filing, absent inaccurate or
incomplete disclosure, and simultaneously prepare impact statements on proposed
developments."
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Although the opinion focused on the deadlines imposed by the
Disclosure Act, the Court looked beyond the time imperatives to
the legislative purpose of the statute. The Scenic Rivers Association argued that under the Disclosure Act, the Secretary could suspend the effective date of the developer's disclosure statement until such time as HUD could prepare an EIS. (This apparently was
the position adopted by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals below.) The Supreme Court rejected this argument and concluded
that if the Secretary undertook such a task, he would "contravene
the purpose of the 30-day provision of the Disclosure Act" which
was "designed to protect developers from delays as a result of the
need to register with HUD." 153
Scenic Rivers Association also argued that the thirty day time
limit could be met if the Secretary ordered the developer to file his
disclosure statement after HUD prepared a preliminary EIS. The
Court similarly rejected this argument, finding such a proposal to
be "no more than a circumvention of the statute's language," and
"equally violative of its purpose." 1
The Flint Ridge decision provides some insight into the scope
of the statutory conflict exemption to NEPA's EIS requirement.
Admittedly, the Supreme Court found a "clear and fundamental
conflict," the incantation necessary for conjuring up the exemption
for federal agency activity. The Court, however, did more than
identify prima facie conflicts based upon mere time limits imposed
by a competing statutory scheme. In reaching its decision, the
Court considered potentially incompatible statutory purposes inherent in the Disclosure Act, despite certain suggestions that
would arguably avoid a conflict with the Disclosure Act's statutory
deadlines. This approach evinced a pragmatic appraisal of an
agency's ability to perform its functions and fulfill legislatively
mandated purposes in light of NEPA's EIS requirement.
Returning to the nuclear export licensing context, and focusing only upon the NNPA's time strictures, the specific deadlines
imposed upon the NRC and State Department are not nearly as
strict as those found in the Disclosure Act under review in the
Flint Ridge decision.1 55 Under the NNPA, the Commission is re153. Id..
154. Id. at 791 n.13.
155. Under Section 304(a), the Executive Branch must issue its judgment as to whether
a proposed nuclear export would constitute a risk to the common defense and security
within sixty days of receiving the application. The Secretary of State can in his discretion
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quired to issue an export license "on a timely basis" which translates, in its most optimistic formulation, into sixty days after receipt of the license application. 156 Although an export license
should be issued as soon as possible, in some cases a period of 120180 days may be pass before the license is granted.
One might argue that time limitations of 120 or 180 days provide ample flexibility for the Commission to perform an EIS analysis, including an assessment of foreign local environmental impacts. These time periods, however, are outside limits; the intent
of the NNPA is to expedite the licensing process and avoid these
outside limits whenever possible. 157 Thus, additional bureaucratic
requirements that would constantly require the NRC to use maximum time period would be incompatible with intent to expedite
the licensing process. 5 8 Moreover, imposing the EIS requirement
on the Commission would open the possibility of litigation that
would inevitably extend the license determination beyond even the
180 day limitation.15 9
Merely focusing upon the NNPA time limits, however, suffers
from a certain legal myopia which the Supreme Court conscientiously avoided when it refused to accept the proposals suggested
by respondent in the Flint Ridge litigation.16 0 NEPA's EIS requirement might conflict with the NNPA's purpose of expediting
review of export licenses in order to serve United States nonproliferation objectives (upon which the NNPA rests and which
motivated Congress to enact the statute). Examining foreign local
environmental impacts on a case-by-case basis would lead to significant licensing delays, particularly in light of the potential obstacles to obtaining necessary information and evaluating this information in a manner responsive to United States and foreign
authorize additional time for considering the application if "it is in the national interest."
The Commission must give "timely consideration" to the application. If the Commission is
unable to make the necessary statutory determinations, then the application must be submitted to the President who can then issue the license by way of an Executive Order. See 42
U.S.C. § 2155 (1979).
156. 42 U.S.C. § 2155(b)(1)-(2) (1979).
157. The NNPA expressly exhorts the Commission to process the license application
concurrently with the Executive Branch review, with a view to issuing the license at the end
of the initial sixty day period. 42 U.S.C. § 2155(b)(2) (1979).
158. See Senator McClure's statement, note 136 supra.
159. Section 304(b) does envisage public participation in the nuclear export licensing
process when such participation is in the public interest and will assist the Commission in
making its statutory determinations. See 42 U.S.C. § 2155a(a)(2) (1979).
160. See text accompanying notes 149-54 supra.
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interests. Such licensing delays are anathema to United States foreign policy under the NNPA. The subtle repercussions of the potential conflict will become more evident when specific international legal and foreign policy factors are discussed below.
D. The Environmental Content of the NNPA and Its Impact on NEPA
The licensing criteria established under Section 305 of NNPA
do not include an environmental protection mandate. 61 However,
the NNPA does contain an environmental provision conspicuously
located in another title of the statute. The substance of this environmental protection provision, its legislative history, and the
placement of this provision in the statute may reveal a congressional intent to have a separate environmental mandate in the nuclear export licensing process, without recourse to NEPA's EIS
obligation.
Title IV of the NNPA, entitled "Negotiation of Further
Export Controls," contains an environmental protection provision-Section 407-that resembles Section 102(2)(E) of NEPA. It
reads:
The President shall endeavor to provide in any agreement [for
cooperation] entered into pursuant to section [123 of the AEA]
for cooperation between the parties in protecting the international environment from radioactive, chemical or thermal contamination arising from peaceful nuclear activities."' 2
161. Section 305 of the NNPA, establishing the new criteria for export licensing, states
that "The United States adopts the following criteria, which, in addition to other requirements of law, will govern exports. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2156 (1976) (emphasis added). One
could argue that the phrase "other requirements of law" may include a pre-existing NEPA
EIS mandate to be applied to each licensing determination. However, in light of the indeterminate nature of the transnational NEPA mandate (see text accompanying notes 38-78
supra) and Congress' intent to expedite the licensing process (see text accompanying notes
162-172, infra), this argument rests on a very slender reed. As will become apparent, "other
requirements of law" was probably a standard boiler plate phrase that encompasses certain
filing and notification requirements established by administrative regulation, general export
control statutes, and international agreements with other countries.
Examples of what might be included in other requirements of law include the regulations established by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for the export and import of nuclear facilities and materials, 10 C.F.R. Part 110 (1980); possible restrictions under the AEA
of 1954; financing requirements imposed by EX-IM Bank.
162. 42 U.S.C. § 2153e (1979). This is not the only mention of environmental protection
in the NNPA. Under Title V, "United States Assistance to Developing Countries," Section
501 provides for international cooperation to assist developing countries in protecting the
international environment and developing alternative energy resources. However, Section
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Inasmuch as Section 407 requires the President to seek bilateral

cooperation to protect the international environment, this provision essentially implements NEPA Section 102(2)(E)'s cooperation
mandate in the field of foreign nuclear commerce, without the foreign policy caveat.

This section generated a considerable amount of debate on the
Senate floor."' 3 During the final debates on the NNPA, Senator
James A. McClure, a major spokesman and contributor in the
NNPA initiative, drew attention to Section 407 and its position in
the draft legislation.
There ... is one subsection [Section 407] . . . which raises significant concerns with regard to the possible misinterpretation of
its statement.... This statement is originally contained in the
Administration's proposed legislation, S. 1432, but in another title
, . . dealing with international cooperation. Placement of the subsection in the policy statement could lead to either administrative
or judicial interpretation leading into a misapplication of the National Environmental Policy Act... requir[ing] the preparation
of environmental impact statements for individual nuclear export
applications, specifically taking into account the environmental
considerations associated with the ultimate destination for the
export in a foreign country. ... Obviously, such a requirement
would raise significant legal, foreign policy, cost, and time delay
considerations. 1

Senator Malcolm Wallop voiced similar fears. In fact, he stated
501 establishes a somewhat broader mandate by urging the United States government to
assist developing nations "in meeting their energy needs through the development of such
resources and the application of non-nuclear technologies consistent with the economic factors, the material resources of those countries, and environmental protection." 22 U.S.C.
§ 3261 (1979).
Moreover, Section 502 requires the United States to begin programs to effectuate the
objectives of Section 501. These programs "shall include both general and country-specific
energy assessments and cooperative projects in resource exploration and production. ..
22 U.S.C. § 3262(b) (1979).
163. The nuclear proliferation control bills introduced in Congess during 1976 did not
contain any mention of the environment or protecting environmental values. See H.R.
15419, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); S. 3853, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). The 1977 legislative
initiatives did contain references to the "international environment" and "world environment." See S. 897, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (which contained a reference to "protecting
the world environment" in the Statement of Purpose section); H.R. 8638, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1977) (which contained a reference to "protecting the international environment"
through "international arrangements or other mutual undertakings" in the International
Nuclear Cooperation Section).
164. 124 CONG. RPc. S 1071 (1978) (emphasis added).
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that if the Senate did not clarify the NNPA so as to expunge any
implication that an EIS was required in export licensing, he would
propose legislation that would explicitly proscribe environmental
impact statements in the decision-making process.165 Both Senators McClure and Wallop expressed their belief that consultation
with foreign governments regarding environmental matters was as
much as the legislation should authorize: "we should not.., involve ourselves in trying to determine site location, the social impact, the other aspects of the usual environmental impact statement that would apply [in the United States]...."1
On February 7, 1978, Senator McClure offered two amendments to relocate the statement of policy regarding the protection
of the international environment to the title dealing with international cooperation. He stated that "it was the intent of the sponsors that the bill remain neutral on the issue of the NEPA requirements for these [nuclear] exports. 1'

67

Section 407 was then added

to the cooperation title with the understanding that "adoption of
the new section

. . .

in no way prejudices positively or negatively

the current debate on the application of NEPA to nuclear exports."" 8" The legislative record then notes:
This would clearly establish the congressional intent that such co165. Id. at S 1081. Senator Wallop continued:
[I] think if we do not make it abundantly clear that NEPA's and CEQ's reach for
power do not apply, then this kind of language [the proposed NEPA prohibition]
will probably become necessary before the bill can responsibly leave the Senate.
We are, as I suggested, engaged in a piece of legislation which is premature,
though necessary should the international talks and agreements in which the U.S.
is involved come to no fruition .... As we go along, I hope that some kind of
assurance can be delivered by these distinguished floor managers that these concerns of mine are not as genuine as I suspect they are.
166. Id. at 1082 (emphasis added). After an exchange with Senator Percy, the Minority
Floor Manager, Senator Wallop, again expressed his belief that environmental issues should
be the subject of international consultation alone, and that unilateral environmental review
could "add to the confusion that might arise by Court challenges to an export sale." He
noted that "the failure to deal with this [issue] seems to put us in a national security as well
as an environmentally insecure position." Id.
In other words, if cooperation was not sought, recipient nations could turn to other
nuclear suppliers that might not be as environmentally concerned as the United States.
Thus, the danger of environmental damage could increase as more non-United States nuclear reactors found their way into the developing world.
167. 124 CONG. REc. S 1449 (1978).
168. Id. The reference to "the current debate" probably is a reference to the efforts
within the Executive Branch to devise a flexible administrative solution, which was revealed
in Exec. Order No. 12114, 44 Fed. Reg. 1957 (1979), 3 C.F.R. 356-60 (1980). See text at notes
206-10 infra.
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operation [in protecting the international environment] would be
the subject of agreement of both parties, that is, the U.S. and the
importing nations, as opposed to any implication that this would
be a unilateral,statutorily mandated requirement for any specific environmental effort related to a nuclear export. 6 9
Senator John Glenn, the majority floor manager, accepted the
amendment, stating: "This new section of the bill places no additional duties on the President with regard to the protection of the
international environment other than in the context of agreements
for cooperation and in no respect addresses any requirements [of]
. . . NEPA .. ."170
Considering the language above, two incongruous congressional intents appear. On the one hand, the NNPA does not provide independent authorization for NEPA-like EIS analysis in the
nuclear export licensing context. However, the debates do not dispositively articulate the intended effect of the NNPA on any possible pre-existing NEPA requirements. The comments of Senators
McClure and Wallop show that Congress was aware of the potential problems associated with the examination of foreign local environmental considerations associated with each nuclear export. The
effort to move Section 407 from the statement of policy to the final
provision in the cooperation title was motivated by these concerns.
Inasmuch as this effort was successful, it may be said to acknowledge and affirm the congressional intent to avoid the application of
NEPA's EIS requirement to nuclear exports. Moreover, the restructuring of the environmental mandate was accompanied by express declarations that unilateral EIS analysis for each nuclear export would frustrate NEPA's primary purpose of promoting
United States strategic interests while protecting important environmental values through a flexible, cooperative approach.
On the other hand, the legislative history indicates that Congress was aware of the debate within the Executive Branch between CEQ and the foreign affairs agencies regarding the substantive environmental mandate and appropriate procedures to be
applied in international NEPA cases.
Senator McClure stated
that the NNPA should remain neutral on the issue of applying
NEPA to nuclear exports to avoid prejudicing the executive branch
debate. This language introduces some degree of confusion, for it
169. 124 CONG. REC. S 1449 (1978) (emphasis added).
170. Id., at S 1453.
171. 124 CONG. REc. S 1449 (1978).
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presents a serious limitation on any inference that Congress intended to insulate nuclear export licensing from NEPA. However,
the specific statements offered by Senators McClure and Wallop
constitute a more definite expression of intent than the vague reference to neutrality regarding the internal executive branch debate
on NEPA. In this context, these statements of neutrality may express Congress' desire to (1) defer to a flexible administrative solution formulated within the executive branch yet (2) insulate the
nuclear export licensing from the strict requirements of NEPA
Section 102(2)(C).172 Thus, Congress may have intended to avoid
interjecting the rigors of NEPA's mandatory EIS procedure into
the export licensing process, particularly in light of the NNPA's
purpose to streamline the licensing process. Yet Congress, being
aware of the environmental issues generally associated with nuclear power reactor operations, may also have intended to preserve
the option of performing some type of environmental analysis (including the examination of foreign local environmental impacts) in
the format of bilateral cooperation. This interpretation would do
justice to the strategic and environmental values shared by members of Congress and brought to the fore by Senators McClure and
Wallop.

V. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL AND POLICY
CONSIDERATIONS
Up to this point, the analysis has focused primarily upon an
examination and interpretation of United States law without reference to international legal considerations. To summarize briefly,
NEPA itself appears to contain an internal procedural ambiguity
inasmuch as Section 102 establishes two distinct mandates. Section
102(2)(C) requires that an EIS be prepared for all major federal
actions affecting the environment, while Section 102(2)(E) specifically addresses itself to environmental responsibility on the international level and merely requires cooperative efforts consistent
with United States foreign policy. Looking to the legislative history
of NEPA does not resolve this dilemma. Although the tenor of
congressional debates indicates Congress' concern with managing
172. Senator McClure concluded by saying that bilateral cooperation, not unilateral
EIS analysis, was the appropriate method of environmental analysis in United States nuclear commercial transactions. It should be noted that he was very much concerned with
avoiding any "statutorily mandated" EIS requirement in the licensing process. See text accompanying note 169 supra.
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the United States environment for the benefit of Americans, cooperative efforts were to be the keystone in the area of international
environmental problems since it was assumed that environmental
questions did not involve sensitive foreign policy considerations or
ideological differences.
Turning to judicial decisions, no United States court has
squarely faced the question of NEPA's EIS requirement as it pertains to foreign local environmental impacts associated with
United States export decisions. Although the international legal
and policy considerations that have constantly surfaced in the
NEPA debate have been alluded to, the courts have avoided these
issues by finding an alternative jurisdictional basis for applying
NEPA to federal agency activities. Yet, these international issues
have in no small way fueled the debate, and as will be seen below,
they have come to occupy a conspicuous position in the recent administrative response to the NEPA-nuclear export problem. 73
Furthermore, since a definitive legal analysis of NEPA's role in international relations has yet to appear, and judges have not been
willing to consider foreign policy factors when enforcing NEPA obligations, 174 there is considerable latitude and need to incorporate
these issues into the analysis.
Finally, Congress has enacted a new nuclear export licensing
statute in an effort to streamline the licensing process and advance
United States national security and nuclear non-proliferation
objectives. The legislative history of this statute strongly indicates
that Congress intended to exclude NEPA's EIS requirement from
the limited area of nuclear exports.
The discussion now leaves the field of United States law and
focuses upon the international legal considerations that have
largely been ignored. Before making this transition, however, two
key elements of United States jurisprudence are critical to the accuracy of the analysis.
First, perhaps the most fundamental notion underlying the
present system of international relations is that of "national sovereignty"-that each nation has the right to enforce its own laws
within its territory, but may not impose these laws upon another
nation or otherwise intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of another government. The United States Supreme Court,
173. See text accompanying notes 200-31 supra.

174. See, e.g., Concerned About Trident v. Rumsfield, 555 F.2d 817, 830 (D.C. Cir.
1977); Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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international tribunals, and the United Nations have affirmed this
basic principal.17 5 From this basic tenet comes the strong legal presumption in American jurisprudence that governs the application
of domestic laws in the transnational context:
Rules of United States statutory law, whether prescribed by federal or state authority, apply only to conduct occurring within, or
having an effect within, the territory of the United
States, unless
176
the contrary is clearly indicated by the statute.
Second, and as a corollary axiom to this legal presumption, is
a deeply-rooted rule of statutory construction-namely, that in the
absence of a clear intention to the contrary, United States statutes
should be read so as not to conflict with principles of international
law and national sovereignty.
[An] act of congress ought never to be construed to violate the

law of nations, if any other possible construction remains.

....

177

175. See, e.g., The Schooner Exchange v. M'Fadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812)
("The jurisdiction of the nation, within its own territory, is necessarily exclusive and absolute."); The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 370 (1824), ("The laws of no nation can justly
extend beyond its own territories, except so far as regards its own citizens. They have no
force to control the sovereignty or rights of any other nation, within its own jurisdiction.");
The S.S. Lotus [19271 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10 at 18 ("The first and foremost restriction
imposed by international law upon a State is that-failing the existence of a permissive rule
to the contrary-it may not exercise its powers in any form in the territory of another
State."); Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation Among States in Accordance With the United Nations Charter, G.A. Resolution 2625 (XXV) (October 24, 1970), as recommended by Sixth Committee, A/8082, reprinted in 24 U.N.Y.B. 788-92 (1970). See also 1 L. OPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW (7th ed.
H. Lauterpacht 1948) 295-302; G. SCHWARZENBERGER & E.D. BROWN, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (6th ed. 1976), 52, 76-77, noting that intervention in one nation's sphere of
domestic jurisdiction constitutes a breach of international law, except perhaps in the area of
criminal law since "the criminal legislation of a sovereign State is not bound to keep within
the limits of territorial and personal jurisdiction. It may attempt to cover acts of foreign
nationals which have been committed abroad." Id., at 77. Thus, enforcement of criminal
statutes abroad, e.g., the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, P.L. 95-213, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78m(b)(2), (3); 78dd-1 and 2; 78ff(c) (1979), must be distinguished from civil or regulatory statutes such as NEPA. For an interesting discussion of the difference between enforcement and prescriptive jurisdiction under international law, see FTC v. Compagnie De SaintGobain-Pont-A-Mousson 636 F.2d 1300, 1315-18 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
176. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 38
(1973). See also Foley Brothers, Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949), wherein the Supreme Court stated that "legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant
to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States."; FTC v. Compagnie
De Saint-Gobain-Pont-A-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300.
177. Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). See
also, The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 370. ("[H]owever general and comprehensive the
phrases used in our municipal laws may be, they must always be restricted in construction,
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This basic principle has recently been reaffirmed in FTC v. Com178
pagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-A-Mousson,
wherein the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia found that the FTC did not
have authority under its organic statute to serve an investigatory
subpoena upon a foreign citizen on foreign soil, such a statutory
interpretation being in conflict with accepted principles of international law.
Congress is customarily presumed, unless a plain intention appears to the contrary, to avoid conflict with... principles
of [in19
ternational law] as well as with the Constitution. 7
Thus, in the absence of any express indication within NEPA
of its legislative history, these principles would require a cautious,
if not restrictive, application of NEPA's EIS requirement abroad if
such application would conflict with international law.
It may be argued that principles of international law and coms
ity o dictate that ultimate determinations regarding the acceptable
level of local environmental impact associated with a nuclear reactor project fall within the purview of the domestic government
where the facility is located.""1 In the past, the United States has
recognized this rule in numerous agreements for cooperation that
reserve primary responsibility for environmental regulation for the
recipient government.1 82
to places and persons, upon whom the legislature have authority and jurisdiction.")
178. 636 F.2d 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1980). This case presented the question: "[D]id Congress
expressly or impliedly authorize the Federal Trade Commission ... to serve its investigatory subpoenas directly upon citizens of other countries by means of registered mail?...
[O]ur answer... is primarly guided by our recognition of established and fundamental
principles of international law." Id., at 1304.
179. Id., at 1306.
180. The principle of comity is one of deference to the interests of foreign sovereign
authorities where the application of one's own national law could work a disproportionate
harm to those foreign interests. The principle is analogous to the weighing of interests test
for resolving conflicts of law between the states of our own federal system. A summarization
of the comity principle is found in the Energy Anti-Monopoly Act of 1979: Hearings on S.
1246 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,96th Cong., 1st Seas. 720-23 (1979) (Statement of James R. Atwood). See also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE

UNITED STATES, § 40 (1963).

181. See generally, 6 M. WHITEmAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, chap. XIV (1968).
See also, Statements of Senators McClure and Wallop, notes 164, 166 and accompanying
text supra.
182. For example, in the NRC proceeding involving the German environmental group,
jurisdiction over health, safety, and environmental matters was reserved to the Federal Republic of Germany and the Commission of the European Communities under the terms of
Articles I and V of the appropriate agreement for cooperation. See Additional Agreement
for Cooperation Between the United States and the European Atomic Energy Commission
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Those advocating the extension of NEPA's EIS requirement
into the area of nuclear export licensing argue that such an extension involves no extraterritorial NEPA application since the EIS
analysis would only affect the United States' decision to export.
This, it is argued, would not interfere with a foreign government's
sovereign rights or responsibilities.183 Others assert that NEPA's
EIS requirement is only "procedural" and therefore believe that an
EIS review would not intrude on foreign sovereign interests or supplant foreign governmental policies.""
These arguments, although superficially appealing, fail to recognize subtle realities of international relations. In the global community, the appearance of intrusion into foreign sovereign matters
can be just as detrimental to United States foreign relations and
non-proliferation objectives as an actual intrusion. Inasmuch as
the licensing of a nuclear reactor export turns upon a United
States evaluation of foreign local environmental impacts and regulatory policies, the appearance of an intrusion would exist.""'
(EURATOM) Concerning Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, June 11, 1960, 11 U.S.T. 2589,
T.I.A.S. No. 4650.
In this regard it should be noted that the United States has other international obligations in the area of nuclear energy. For example, under the terms of the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729
U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter cited as NPT] the nuclear weapons nations are obligated to assist
other nations in the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The obligation of
the non-nuclear weapons nations to forego the development of nuclear weapons is premised
upon the reciprocal duty of the weapons nations to reduce their nuclear arsenals and share
the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology. Specifically, Article IV(2) of the Treaty states:
All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and
technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the
Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together
with other States or international organizations to the further development of the
applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of
non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due cosideration for the
needs of the developing areas of the world.
Apart from our purely international legal obligations is the realization that a decision to
terminate nuclear commerce, based on environmental factors, could 'induce other nations to
terminate their obligations under the NPT. Already, the developing nations have expresed
extreme disappointment with the failure of the weapons nations to fulfill their obligations
under the NPT, and they have hinted at the possibility of dropping out of the NPT regime.
See Epstine, Nuclear Proliferation:The Failureof the Review Conference, 17 SuWVIVAL 262
(1975); Halsted, Report from Geneva, 5 ARms CONTROL TODAY (1975).
183. See, e.g., Note, supra note 10, at 352, 378.
184. Id., at 353.
185. The Unified Procedures, discussed below, recognize the importance of avoiding
such appearances, given the sensitivities of foreign governments. See text accompanying
note 228 infra.
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More to the point, there are circumstances where an intrusion
into foreign sovereignty might occur through an apparently innocent United States licensing procedure that considers foreign environmental factors. The Babcock & Wilcox proceeding before the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission is such an example."' In that
case, a German environmental group petitioned the NRC for
standing to challenge a nuclear reactor export to West Germany,
claiming that the German reactor project would adversely affect
the local environment. If the Commission had allowed the
Germans to intervene in its licensing decision, it would have admitted issues into the licensing proceeding that had been addressed and resolved by the competent licensing authority in the
Federal Republic of Germany and that were under review in the
German courts. 8 7 In arguing that the NRC must prepare a foreign
EIS, the German petitioner was in effect advocating that the NRC
should rule on the adequacy of German law and procedures for
protecting the German environment. As pointed out by the party
in opposition, the Commission could not take such action without
186. See 5 N.R.C. at 1332.
187. In this case, it appeared that the petitioner was asking the Commission to conduct
a "good faith" assessment of the environmental impact of the Milheim-K~rlich nuclear
power plant, and to find, in effect, that the Ministry of Trade and Transportation of the
State of Rheinland-Pfalz and the Administrative Court of Koblenz of the Federal Republic
of Germany had not performed their environmental duties. In the affidavit fied in support
of the petition to intervene, petitioner listed in detail the steps which it had already taken
in West Germany in opposition to the plant. Petitioner then stated: "Despite their efforts,
petitioner and its members have been unable to obtain either from their local, state, and
federal governments, the operating utility or the applicant, a comprehensive, objective, and
good faith assessment of the environmental impact of and reasonable alternatives to construction and operation of the Plant." See Babcock & Wilcox.Response In Opposition to the
Petition of BAM for Leave to Intervene, filed February 28, 1977, at 25 n.44.
The NRC staff argued that the specific issues which the petitioner was seeking to introduce into the proceeding were standard radiological health and safety matters. These matters had been entrusted to German authorities and considered by the appropriate licensing
officials.
This intervention could be distinguished from the intervention of Canadian environmentalists in the Wilderness Society litigation. In the NRC proceeding, petitioners had
sought review in their own legal system and had failed. The German authorities had primary responsibility and expertise for making the decision on the local radiological emissions
from a nuclear plant to be constructed and operated in West Germany. However, in the
Wilderness Society, the United States government retained control over the Trans-Alaskan
Pipeline project, and had the authority to make the decision on routing the Pipeline. The
Canadian authorities had not issued a contrary opinion on the particular issue under review.
In fact, it was not clear that the Canadians had any authority to review the question being
litigated in the United States court. See text at notes 81-90 supra.
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contravening the Act of State Doctrine. 8' Moreover, the German
government informed the Department of State through diplomatic
channels that it would view any United States environmental review as an unwarranted intrusion into the German government's
sovereign jurisdiction. 189
Clearly the United States can place certain conditions on its
commercial intercourse with other nations. These conditions have
traditionally been linked to United States national security interests. 190 Yet, ostensibly altruistic United States efforts to assess foreign environmental impacts may in fact result in the imposition of
United States standards on foreign governments and people. An
environmental assessment itself implies a process of judgment, of
weighing alternatives and making choices. The NEPA EIS requirement was not intended to be disembodied from the decisionmaking
process.1 91 The EIS analysis necessarily entails socio-economic
choices based on values and developmental objectives that a recipient government may view differently from our own government.
An export license denial, based upon an adverse evaluation of for188. See Babcock & Wilcox Responseto BAM Petition, supra note 187, where it noted:
[I]n Cooley v. Weinberger, 389 F. Supp. 479 (1974), aff'd 514 F.2d 1151 (10th Cir.
1975) [the court stated]: Every sovereign state must recognize the independence of
every other sovereign state and the courts of one will not sit in judgment of the
act of the government of another done within its own territory.
See Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897). It should be noted that since that
time the Supreme Court has apparently carved out a large exception to the Act of State
Doctrine in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc., v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976), based
on the "commercial" nature test for foreign governmental activities found in the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976. However, it would seem quite clear that environmental
protection and licensing decisions are not "commercial" tasks, and that the Federal Republic of Germany's environmental proceeding would fall within the Act of State Doctrine as a
"sovereign" act.
189. See Memorandum from Louis V. Nosenzo, supra note 68. Similarly, in FTC v.
Compagnie De Saint-Gobain-Pont-A-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300 the court took notice of a diplomatic note sent from the French Embassy to the United States Department of State protesting the FTC's direct transmittal of its subpoena upon a French company in Paris via
registered mail, claiming that it violated French national sovereignty and international law.
Id., at 1306 n.18. The court expressly noted that in light of "the foreign sensibilities aroused
by the mode of delivery used here, the district court's finding that Congress 'intended' the
FTC to deliver its compulsory process soley with the aid of foreign postal authorities seems
mistaken." Id. at 1315.
190. Indeed, in the area of nuclear exports, the licensing criteria found in the NNPA, as
well as the terms contained in our numerous agreements for cooperation, clearly point out
that foreign concessions on United States national security considerations constitute the
quid pro quo for United States nuclear commerce.
191. See Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d at 1123, 1127-28;
County of Suffolk v. Sec'y of the Interior, 562 F.2d 1368, 1378-80 (2d Cir. 1977); Trinity
Episcopal School Corp. v. Harris, 445 F. Supp. 204, 220 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
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eign environmental factors that are acceptable to the foreign gov-

ernment, would to some extent usurp the foreign government's
decisionmaking authority.19 2
Another international legal and policy dilemma may exist if
the NEPA EIS requirement is extended unilaterally to cover foreign local environmental impacts. As noted earlier, nuclear com-

merce between the United States and other nations must occur
under a valid agreement for cooperation-an international legal instrument binding upon the United States government.1 93 Under
the NNPA, the President is required, when negotiating new agreements, to seek a provision for cooperation in protecting the international environment.' To the extent a foreign government and
the United States bind themselves to such cooperation, a unilateral
EIS analysis of foreign environmental impacts may be preempted.19 5 A unilateral United States attempt to examine foreign
192. This danger of intrusion becomes even more pronounced as United States courts
interpret NEPA to embody substantive environmental standards. See Note, supra note 10,
at 354, n.20.
193. See text accompanying notes 24-25 supra.
194. 42 U.S.C. § 2153e (1979).
195. According to the United States Constitution:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land....
U.S. CONST. art. VI, el. 2. The United States courts have indicated that self-executing treaties and federal statutes are on equal par, and that a treaty that is inconsistent with a
previously enacted federal statute will take precedence. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18
n.34 (1957); Chae Chin Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889); Tag v. Rogers, 267
F.2d 664, 667-68 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 904 (1960); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 141, comment b, § 145 (1963); 14 M.
WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 316-21 (1970); H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 555-79 (2d ed. 1976). However, it is not clear that an executive
agreement, entered into by the President alone, would prevail against a conflicting federal
statute. On the one hand, United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942), indicates that an
executive agreement may have the same force and effect as a treaty inasmuch as such an
agreement is evidence of "superior federal policy." Id. at 231. See Ozanic v. United States,
188 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1951) (Lend Lease Settlement Agreement of July 19, 1948, overrides
United States government's consent to be sued found in Public Vessels Act of 1925). On the
other hand, the RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra § 144 states that
an executive agreement, made without reference to a treaty or act of Congress, cannot supersede prior inconsistent acts of Congress. Since an executive agreement is an exercise of
executive power, it cannot repeal an existing federal statute validly enacted by Congress. It
is not clear what the status of an "agreement for cooperation" would be vis-i-vis a prior
inconsistent federal statute. It should be noted, however, that a subsequent federal statute
cannot alter or eliminate the United States government's international obligations as embodied in a prior inconsistent international agreement. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW, supra § 145(2).
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local environmental impacts of a reactor export might violate the
terms of the negotiated agreement. Under these circumstances, the
continuing relationship with the recipient nation would be jeopard-

ized. The recipient government might decide that the United
States violation relieved it of its own safeguard obligations under

the agreement, 198 thereby posing serious consequences for United
States non-proliferation objectives. Additionally, the recipient nation could decide to terminate any further nuclear commerce with
the United States, again to the detriment of United States nonproliferation strategy.19 7 Thus, to the extent that NEPA is interpreted as requiring unilateral analysis of foreign local environmental impacts, it may create a conflict between the United States obligations under domestic law and its international obligations
under agreements for cooperation.1 9 8
Finally, it should be noted that any assessment of the actual
196. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 60, opened for signature
May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27 (1969), 8 .L. M. 679 (1969). Article 60 reads: "A
material breach of a bilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles the other to invoke the
breach as a ground for terminating the treaty or suspending its operations in whole or in
part." The Vienna Convention, although not binding as a legal instrument on non-signatories, is generally viewed as embodying the basic principles of customary international law
that are binding on all nations.
197. At the same time, if no agreement for cooperation on the protection of the international environment can be reached, a unilateral attempt to assess foreign local environmental impacts could further exacerbate tense relations between the United States and the recipient nation.
A contrary argument may exist. Agreements for cooperation contain language to the
effect that they are subject to the applicable laws, regulations, and license requirements of
the United States government. See, e.g., Agreement for Cooperation in the Civil Uses of
Atomic Energy, Aug. 8, 1963, United States-India, art. V, 14 U.S.T. 1484, T.I.AS. No. 5446;
Agreement for Cooperation in the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, Nov. 24, 1973, United
States-Korea, art. II, para. A, 24 U.S.T. 775, T.I.A.S. No. 7583. It is unclear whether this
language refers only to laws in force as of the date of the agreement, or whether it incorporates laws that come into force after the agreement is executed. It should be noted that the
established international legal principle-pacta sunt servanda (that all treaties must be
honored in good faith)-would not favor the use of later-enacted domestic legislation to
materially alter the terms of an international agreement.
198. The amended AEA recognizes the broad discretion vested in the Executive Branch
with regard to the conduct of United States foreign policy and the authority to negotiate
and enter into binding international legal obligations. The AEA directs the Commission to
give "maximum effect to the policies contained in any international arrangement made after
[the date of the enactment of the AEA]." 42 U.S.C. § 2152 (1979). One may conjecture that
inasmuch as the application of NEPA's EIS requirements to foreign local environmental
impacts would compromise United States non-proliferation objectives, as well as obligations
contained in international agreements, such an application of NEPA would run afoul of the
legal mandate to the NRC found in the AEA. Again, an effort to reconcile the two statutes
cautions a limited interpretation of the NEPA EIS obligation in the transnational context.
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and potential impacts of a nuclear reactor on the surrounding population and environment cannot be performed unless extensive information on a wide range of issues is available. 199 Data on the local environment, energy demands (present and projected),
alternative energy supplies, the mode of reactor operation, support

services and facilities (e.g., waste management and storage), developmental objectives of the host government, security arrangements, and local demographic make-up would need to be obtained
from the host government. If the recipient government declined to
provide such information, or to permit the United States officials
to enter its jurisdiction to secure the requisite data, the problem of
intrusion would inevitably arise. Without this information, the validity and accuracy of any EIS examining foreign environmental
impacts would be in serious doubt. However, if the foreign government authorized United States officials to prepare such an analysis
and supplied the information, the issue would no longer be one of
unilateral application of the EIS mandate, but would properly fall
within the cooperation mandate of NEPA Section 102(2)(E).
As mentioned at the outset, the international factors have
largely been overlooked by scholars and judges alike. The fact that
domestic NEPA law is in many ways counterposed to these international considerations, highlights the dilemma of applying
NEPA's EIS mandate to nuclear reactor export licensing. At this
time, the discussion turns to the most recent administrative proposal that has sought to reconcile this inherent conflict between our
national and foreign policies.
VI.

THE ADMINISTRATION'S RESPONSE TO
THE PROBLEM

The introduction to this article noted that the absence of clear
judicial or congressional guidance on the question of NEPA's
transnational application has resulted in a continuing bureaucratic
skirmish within the United States government. A host of administrative statements, memoranda, and procedures have been proposed, discussed, and debated. A brief foray through this outpouring provides some background to the most recent administrative
response to the problem.
199. But see the Darien Gap litigation and appeal, text accompanying notes 99-103

supra, where the environmental analysis of the highway's impact on local Indian tribes was
minimal due to limited information, yet it was upheld on appeal.
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The CEQ has issued two memoranda explaining its position on
the transnational application of NEPA. °° In the first document,
the CEQ was of the opinion that the EIS mandate extended to all
significant effects of major federal actions wherever those effects or
federal actions occurred. 0 1 In the subsequent memorandum this
opinion was modified, reflecting a concern with foreign policy considerations as well as practical limitations on United States re02
sponsibilities in foreign jurisdictions.
The President's Message to the Congress on the Environment208 provided additional support for the position that NEPA
may apply in certain transnational environmental situations. In
that message, President Carter stated that economic development
assistance programs should be "environmentally sound," but he
recognized that "whether to try to prevent or undo environmental
damage is a decision each country must make for itself. '204 He also
instructed the Secretary of State, Administrator of the Agency for
International Development, and other concerned agencies, "to en200. Memorandum to Heads of Agencies on Applying the EIS Requirement to Environmental Impacts Abroad (September 24, 1976); Memorandum to Heads of Agencies on Application of the National Environmental Policy Act to Federal Activities Abroad (January
19, 1978) [hereinafter referred to respectively as the 1976 or 1978 Memorandum.]
201. 1976 Memorandum, supra note 200, at 8-9. The 1976 Memorandum proposed a
two-step process whereby federal agencies would be required to perform a preliminary assessment of the potential environmental impacts of their actions abroad. If the preliminary
assessment revealed significant environmental impacts, the agency would then be obligated
to prepare an EIS. CEQ's position would not permit foreign policy or related considerations
to vitiate the preparation of an EIS when significant environmental impact was likely. The
CEQ asserted that NEPA was fully applicable to foreign local environmental impacts.
202. In the 1978 Memorandum, supra note 200, at 4, the CEQ retrenched from its earlier position articulated in the 1976 Memorandum:
Earlier, reference was made to the fact CEQ's present proposals recognize and
make allowance for unusual and exceptional circumstances involved in federal
agencies' activities in foreign countries. CEQ does so by limiting the applicability
of the standard EIS procedure only to those major activities abroad whose significant environmental impact affect (1) the United States and its trust territories; (2)
the global commons, such as the oceans; (3) Antarctica.
For all other major activities having a significant environmental impact
outside the United States, the federal agency may, in consultation with CEQ, provide for abbreviated "Foreign Environmental Statements" whose preparation can
take into account special factors as:
1. Diplomatic considerations
2. Availability of Information
3. Commercial competition
4. Commercial confidentiality
5. Extent of agency role in the proposed activity.
203. 13 WEEKLY CoMp. OF PREs. Doc. 782 (1977).
204. Id. at 793.
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sure full consideraton of the environmental soundness of development projects under review ... ,
On January 4, 1979, an Executive Order on "Environmental
Effects Abroad of Major Federal Actions" was issued in an effort
"to further environmental objectives consistent with the foreign
policy and national security of the United States."206 This order is
the progeny of the vigorous debate between the various administrative agencies concerning the application of NEPA abroad; as
such, it represents a compromise position that attempts to balance
United States environmental interests with foreign
policy (in par207
ticular, nuclear non-proliferation) considerations.
This Executive Order directs appropriate federal agencies to
develop procedures that permit consideration, where appropriate,
of foreign environmental factors in their decisionmaking process. It
also provides several exemptions that are closely related to national security interests.208 On its face, the Order does not grant
authority to evaluate and act upon foreign environmental factors;
instead, it requires that procedures be established that take such
environmental factors into account.20 9 The Order was not issued
205. Id.
206. Exec. Order No. 12114, 44 Fed. Reg. 1957, preamble (1979), 3 C.F.R. 356 (1980).
207. Section 2-2 clearly states as an objective the development of a program of information exchange with foreign nations so as to "heighten awareness of and interest in environmental concerns and.. . facilitate environmental cooperation with foreign nations." Moreover, Section 2-4 states that the procedures for considering environmental factors should be
"consistent with the foreign and national security policies of the U.S." The accompanying
White House Fact Sheet emphasized that "consideration of environmental impacts abroad
bears on important foreign, economic and national security policy goals and interests. The
Order is designed to minimize any adverse effect upon U.S. exports and to further the Administration's nuclear non-proliferation, national security and other foreign policy objectives." 44 Fed. Reg. 18,723 (1979), 3 C.F.R. 357 (1980).
The clear reference to United States non-proliferation objectives speaks to the necessity
of preserving and enhancing United States reliability as a nuclear supplier in international
nuclear commerce.
208. These include actions involving national security concerns, actions occurring during the course of armed conflict, intelligence activities, and emergency relief. Exec. Order,
supra note 206, at § 2-5(a), 3 C.F.R. 358 (1980).
209. The legal effect of the Executive Order is not clear. Looking to established constitutional limitations on the "legislative powers" of the President tends to rebut any inference
that the Order imposes NEPA-like EIS duties on federal agencies operating in the foreign
affairs arena. First, the Order was issued pursuant to the President's independent constitutional authority. See 44 Fed. Reg. 18,723, 3 C.F.R. 356 (1980). ("The Order is based on my
independent constitutional authority. . .."). The Executive Order does not rest on the legal
mandate of NEPA or the NNPA. As such, the Order does not implement a defined statutory command; rather, it is essentially an administrative directive from the Office of the
President to other Executive Branch agencies, imposing administrative duties in their deci-
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pursuant to any authority under NEPA.21 °
On November 13, 1979, the Department of State, Department
of Energy, and Export-Import Bank, in consultation with the CEQ,
promulgated their "Unified Procedures Applicable to Major Federal Actions Relating to Nuclear Activities Subject to Executive
Order 12114. ' 11 The introductory statement to these procedures
articulated the position that NEPA did not have a legal role to
play in nuclear export licensing, independent of the new
procedures.
The [Executive] Order represents the exclusive and complete
determination by the United States Government of the procedural and other actions to be taken by Federal agencies to further
the purposes of the [NEPA] with respect to the environment
outside the United States....

sion-making procedure.

It is an established principle of constitutional jurisprudence that the President's constitutional duty to take "Care that the Laws be faithfully executed" cannot, by itself, give an
executive order the force and effect of law. See Independent Meatpackers Assoc. v. Butz,
526 F.2d 228, 235 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 966 (1976); Youngstown Sheet and
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). In the absence of an express delegation of authority or a statutory mandate from Congress, the President cannot act as a lawmaker by issuing
an executive order. See Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. at 587, 655
("The Constitution limits [the President's] functions in the lawmaking process to the recommending of laws and vetoing of laws ...

";

"The Executive . . . has no legislative

powers.")
Furthermore, an executive order that is not consistent with a valid statute is of no
effect. See Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. at 587-88 (opinion of the
Court), 637-38 (Jackson, J., concurring- "When the President takes measures incompatible
with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb.... Courts
can sustain exclusive presidential control in such a case only by disabling the Congress from
acting upon the subject."), 660 (Burton, J., concurring), 662 (Clark, J., concurring). See also
Independent Meatpackers Assoc. v. Butz, 526 F.2d at 235; Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum Co.,
563 F.2d 216, 227 (5th Cir. 1977) (relying upon Youngstown Sheet and Tube for the proposition that "executive orders may not override contradictory congressional expressions.").
Here, Congress, through the NNPA, established six specific export licensing criteria and
indicated (at least in the context of NRC licensing authority) that these six criteria were to
be the sole basis for an export licensing decision. See note 136 and accompanying text
supra. Section 101 of the NNPA states that "The Commission shall... authorize the export of nuclear materials and equipment when all the applicable statutoryrequirements are
met." 22 U.S.C. § 3221 (1979) (emphasis added). Accord, 42 U.S.C. § 2155(b)(1) (1979).
Given Congress' clear intention to streamline the licensing process, interpreting Executive
Order 12114 as infusing NEPA-like requirements in the licensing process may conflict with
the explicit and implied mandate contained in the NNPA and run afoul of established constitutional limitations on the President's power.
210. See Exec. Order, supra note 206, at § 1-1; 44 Fed. Reg. 18,723, 3 C.F.R. 356-57
(1980).
211. 44 Fed. Reg. 65,560 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Unified Procedures].
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These procedures will provide for consideration of environmental
2 12
issues without impairing U.S. reliability as a nuclear supplier.
The introductory statement stipulates that the procedures
were designed to allow environmental review within the time limits
set by the NNPA for executive branch consideration of an export
license application.2 13 In order to emphasize the "non-NEPA" basis for the procedures, the introduction concludes:
The Order and these procedures are intended solely for the purpose of establishing internal guidance and are not intended to
create or enlarge any procedural rights against any Federal
214
agency.
This proposition is reflected in a provision stating that "nothing in
'21 5
these procedures shall be construed to create a cause of action.
Thus, environmental analysis pursuant to these new administrative
procedures does not envisage litigation or public challenge typical
of environmental analysis under NEPA.
The Unified Procedures are comprised of three distinct sections. Part A contains general provisions; Part B establishes the
environmental analysis procedures; Part C sets forth several technical rules. This analysis focuses on those sections that bear
directly upon the environmental duties of federal agencies in nuclear export licensing. The discussion highlights the non-NEPA
character of the environmental mandate contained in these procedures, with the emphasis clearly being on flexibility and agency
discretion.
Section 3 appears to be the trigger mechanism for the preparation of an environmental document. "Major federal actions" that
warrant environmental analysis are defined as those that provide a
foreign nation with a nuclear reactor, production facility, or nuclear waste management facility.2 16 According to Section 4, in the
event that any significant environmental impact will occur in a foreign jurisdiction, the State Department must prepare an "environmental document" consisting of either a bilateral or multilateral
"environmental study" or a "concise review of the environmental
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 65,563, § 17.
216. "Nuclear reactor" also includes the nuclear steam supply system, a major component of any commercial nuclear power reactor. "Production facility" is defined in 10 C.F.R.
§ 50.2(a) (1979). See Unified Procedures, 44 Fed. Reg. at 65,560, § 2(g).
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issues involved, i.e., an environmental assessment, a summary en-

vironmental analysis, or other appropriate document." ' For actions affecting the global commons, an environmental impact statement (generic, programmatic, or specific) is required. 18
Thus, Section 4 distinguishes between foreign local environmental impacts and global impacts for purposes of the necessary
documentation and scope of analysis. The former warrants an "environmental document" quite different from a typical EIS, while
the latter still demands the traditional EIS analysis.
The content and format of an environmental document prepared for activities having foreign local impacts are established in
Section 8. There are nine categories of information to be provided
in the document.2 19 These categories fall far short of the analysis
required in the domestic EIS. Most of the information is of a descriptive nature, portraying the recipient nation's need for the nuclear project and the foreign government's methods of regulating
the development and use of nuclear energy. An evaluation of the
adequacy of these regulatory methods is not required. The environmental impact discussion is limited to a number of questions
regarding site selection, characteristics of the exported nuclear facility, and whether the foreign or United States government has
considered these factors in the planning of the project. There is no
express obligation for the licensing authorities to discuss alternatives to the nuclear project, the specific impacts of the project on
the foreign natural enviornment and population, any irreversible
217. Unified Procedures, 44 Fed. Reg. at 65,560-61, § 4(a)(1)-(2) (emphasis added).
218. Id. at 65,561, § 4(b).
219. Id. at 65,562, § 8(b). The nine categories can be summarized as follows: (1) a
description of the recipient nation's energy program, (2) a description of the nuclear export
project, (3) a description of any cooperative programs that the recipient nation may have
with other countries, including the United States, dealing with environmental or regulatory
matters, (4) a discussion of the regulatory mechanisms, if any, that the recipient nation has
and that are applicable to the proposed nuclear export, (5) a discussion of environmental
standards which the recipient nation has adopted and how they compare with IAEA or
other internationally recognized standards, (6) a discussion of the salient site characteristics
and any special considerations that might constitute a threat to the environment, including
any significant radioactive, chemical, or thermal effects that would normally be discussed for
a similar United States domestic project, as well as a description of any waste disposal
plans, (7) a discussion of whether the exported equipment is being manufactured in compliance with quality assurance standards that are required for domestic nuclear reactors, (8) a
discussion of whether the environmental effects that may occur in the recipient nation's
territory, and are identified in subsection 6, are being taken into account in the planning of
the project, and (9) a discussion of whether any environmental effects that might occur in
another country, and that have been identified in subsection 6, are being taken into account.
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commitment of natural resources, or whether the project represents the best alternative in terms of the maximum recyclable resource potential.2 20
The Unified Procedures also provide a wide variety of exemptions and discretionary modifications that further demonstrate the
non-NEPA character of the environmental mandate contained
within. In particular, Sections 5 and 16 allow agency officials considerable leeway in deciding whether to prepare any kind of environmental document. Under Section 5, no less than fourteen exemptions are created. 221 The most significant are:
1. "actions not having a significant effect on the environment
outside the United States" as determined by the federal
agency officials themselves with some guidance from Section
7;222

2. actions taken by the President (which would probably include
nuclear reactor export licenses issued by executive order in
those instances where the NRC does not issue an export 22i-s
cense within a reasonably timely period under the NNPA);
3. actions taken by the President or a Cabinet officer when the
national security or interest is involved (this would apparently
include actions by the Secretary 224of State under Section
126(a)(91)(A) and (B) of the AEA);
4. export licenses (which apparently exempts the final NRC licensing decisions from the procedures, since under the AEA
and NNPA, it is the NRC that has ultimate responsibility for
issuing an export license); 225 and,
4. the broad catch all clause--"any particular action for which
the appropriate official of that agency determines that an exemption is necessary with respect to that agency to meet emergency circumstances, situations involving exceptional foreign
policy and national security sensitivities, or other special
220. Section 102(2)(C) of NEPA provides that detailed impact statements must include
a discussion of: (1) the environmental impact of the proposed action, (2) any adverse envi-

ronmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented, (3) alternatives to the proposed action and their impacts, (4) the relationship between local short term
uses of the environment, and maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(5) any irreversible or irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in
the proposed action should it be implemented. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976).
221. Unified Procedures, 44 Fed. Reg. at 65,561, § 5.
222. Id. at 65,561, § 5a.

223. Id. at 65,561, § 5b.
224. Id. at 65,561, §5c.
225. Id. at 65,561, § 5e. This provision may be a tacit recognition of the President's lack
of executive authority over the NRC, which is an independent regulatory agency.
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Thus, Section 5 carves out a wide swath of exempted actions that
would otherwise be subject to the NEPA EIS mandate, if indeed
that statute were applicable to the nuclear export licensing
process.
Section 16 allows for the modification of the content, preparation time, and availability of an environmental document if such
modification is necessary:
1. to allow the federal government to act promptly (apparently,
this means within the statutory deadlines established by the
NNPA,2 7 but it could also mean an even shorter period of
2

time);

2. to "avoid adverse impacts on foreign relations or infringement
in fact or appearance of other nations' sovereign responsibilities; '228 or,

3. to ensure an appropriate reflection of diplomatic factors, international commercial, competitive and export promotion factors, national security considerations, difficulties of obtaining
information, and agency ability to analyze meaningfully environmental effects of a proposed action ....329

In actual operation, these modifications grant broad discretion to
forego the established requirements of the Unitifed Procedures
and to perform a rather pro forma environmental assessment if circumstances so dictate. NEPA EIS requirements, as we know them
in the domestic context, have no direct analogue in this system of
environmental protection.
It is obvious that the environmental obligations contained
within the Unified Procedures are limited significantly by exemptions and the discretion vested in federal agency officials.2 30 The
226. Id.
227. Id. at 65,563, § 16a. The Unified Procedures specify that the environmental review
should be completed promptly so as to be circulated no later than ten days prior to the time
when any related Executive Branch recommendation must be given to the NRC pursuant to
Section 126(a)(1) of the amended AEA. See §§ 9, 10b. If the document is not prepared and
circulated within that time, Section 16a apparently would permit a modification on the basis
of deadline requirements.
228. Id. at 65,563, § 16b (emphasis added). See text accompanying note 185 supra.
229. Id. at 65,563, § 16(c) (emphasis added).
230. It is noteworthy in this regard that commercial considerations (apparently of the
United States nuclear supplying company or the foreign utility) can obviate the scope and
breadth of an environmental assessment under section 16c(2). Obviously, if the nuclear supplier can petition and convince the State Department that commercial interests require a
truncated environmental review, these procedures fall short of the strict NEPA EIS obliga-
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balance struck by the Unified Procedures is decidedly in favor of
national security and non-proliferation objectives as opposed to
unilateral environmental analysis of foreign local impacts. Moreover, the practical and pragmatic aspects of collecting and assessing information, of diplomatic sensitivities, and of timing, are accentuated and given considerable deference in the established
procedures.
In conclusion, the environmental review requirements under
the Unified Procedures are quite limited, both in terms of "when"
environmental analysis will enter into the decision-making process,
and "what" will be required of federal agencies in discharging their
responsibilities. This administrative remedy is clearly responsive to
the problems of foreign policy and national security. The procedures support the hypothesis that the strictures of the EIS requirement found in NEPA may not wholly survive the enactment
of the NNPA at least in the area of nuclear reactor exports.
VII.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Examining the issue of NEPA's EIS requirement in the nuclear export licensing context demonstrates the difficulty of extending such obligations into foreign jurisdictions. The problem of
transnational application becomes most vivid when NEPA is applied to foreign local environmental impacts, as opposed to impacts either in the United States or on the global commons. Shifting the focus of inquiry to environmental impacts arising wholly
within a foreign territory highlights the legal, diplomatic, and practical considerations that caution against the mandatory and full
application of NEPA's EIS requirement.
The transnational NEPA question is much more of an inquiry
into proper legal procedure than a debate on moral responsibility;
the question focuses on the conflict between unilateral EIS review
under NEPA Section 102(2)(C) and multilateral/bilateral cooperation under Section 102(2)(E). There is no question that in the cooperative context, the United States should exert its fullest energy
to protect the global and foreign environments. 3 1
tions. Furthermore, Section 16 allows for modification of the content of the environmental
assessment if the State Department cannot meaningfully analyze the collected data.
231. See 1978 Hearings on Senate Resolution 49, supra note 5, at 3-14 (statements of

Senator Claiborne Pill and Asst. Secretary Robert C. Brewster); 1977 Hearings on Senate
Resolution 49, supra note 111, at 33 (statement of Senator Hubert Humphrey); id., at 40
(letter from Patsy Mink to Senator Claiborne Pell).
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This article has attempted to demonstrate that the unilateral
EIS analysis, familar to United States domestic projects, was not
intended for United States transnational activities which result in
foreign local environmental impacts. At best, there is insufficient
evidence of congressional intent to extend the EIS requirement to
all United States activities and their attendant impacts, wherever
they might occur throughout the world. Moreover, in the specific
area of nuclear export licensing, there is persuasive legislative history and administrative precedent that would strongly argue
against application of the EIS mandate to foreign environmental
impacts of nuclear exports. Instead, NEPA, the NNPA, and the
recent administrative response indicate that bilateral cooperation
should be the primary instrument of transnational environmental
protection.
Most of the problem of transnational environmental responsibility could be resolved if the foreign recipient government was intimately involved in the environmental effort and encouraged to
shoulder the responsibility for environmental review. This would
in all likelihood lead to more accurate results, as well as a more
cooperative spirit in addressing identified environmental problems.
At the same time, this would avoid undue delay, litigation, and
premature termination of meritorious United States projects that
benefit foreign nations.
Nonetheless, there may be instances where cooperation is not
possible, or is insufficient in light of the unique characteristics of a
proposed United States activity that engenders serious environmental impacts in foreign territory. Moreover, in other areas of
federal transnational activity, where competing legal and political
considerations are not as pronounced as in the nuclear export area,
there may be more room to apply NEPA's EIS mandate. In these
situations, an additional approach, beyond the cooperation mandate, may be needed which allows for a "limited," (i.e., in the sense
of scope and frequency of the EIS analysis) extension of the EIS
requirement to transnational activity. Extraterritorial enforcement
of antitrust laws provides a possible analogue. 23 2 This line of cases
232. One might look to the landmark case of Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of
America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976), which addressed the problem of extending United
States antitrust laws into foreign commercial transactions. In determining whether United
States jurisdiction may be asserted in cases involving alleged antitrust violations in foreign
countries, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals articulated a jurisdictional "rule of reason,"
which offered a three-prong test for asserting jurisdiction. The three-prong test can be summarized as follows: (1) Does the alleged restraint affect United States foreign or interstate
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developed the so-called jurisdictional "rule of reason," that "When
foreign relations are involved .. it is unwise to ignore the fact
that foreign policy, reciprocity, comity, and limitations of judicial
power are considerations that should have a bearing on the decision to exercise or decline jurisdiction. 33 Several factors could be
considered in determining what type of EIS should be required in
any particular transnational endeavor including: (1) continued
United States governmental involvement'in the foreign project either in terms of actual control over the project or proprietary interest; (2) nature of the federal action; (3) probability that foreign
environmental impacts may spill over into the global commons or
United States territory or otherwise seriously affect United States
citizens; (4) foreign policy complications in sensitive areas of national security; (5) contravening international legal principles or
obligations; (6) sufficiency of information available to United
commerce, or was it so intended? (2) Is the injury of a kind and magnitude cognizable under
United States antitrust laws? and (3) As a matter of comity and international fairness,
should United States jurisdiction be asserted? In doing so the court noted:
[A]t some point the interests of the United States are too weak and the foreign
harmony incentive for restraint too strong to justify an extraterritorial assertion of
jurisdiction.
[In reaching an appropriate decision in this issue] the elements to be weighed
include the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the nationality or allegiance of the parties and the locations and principal places of business of the corporations, the extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected to
achieve compliance, the relative significance of effects on the United States as
compared with those elsewhere, and the relative importance of the violations
charged of conduct within the United States as compared with conduct abroad.
549 F.2d at 609, 614.
233. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1296 (3d Cir. 1979). In
reaching its decision, the court recognized that through the antitrust laws, Congress had
committed the United States to a policy of free enterprise and competition. Id. at 1296.
Similarly, the United States is committed to environmental protection. Yet, it is the very
fact that foreign interests and values are implicated when United States laws are applied
trananationally that necessitates an approach different from that utilized in a purely domestic case. As soon as the transnational element is interjected into the decision to apply
United States laws (laws that arguably were intended to operate absent foreign policy considerations), then three competing factors are introduced into the decisionmaking process:
(1) the foreign policy objectives embraced by the current administration or associated with the particular issue at hand,
(2) the domestic and foreign policy interests of the foreign government that may
be affected by the application and enforcement of U.S. Law, and,
(3) the feasibility and practicality of enforcing U.S. laws in the transnational context, particularly when the legal mandate to be applied is primarily directed
toward domestic U.S. activities.
Flexibility in fashioning an appropriate rule of law becomes the keynote to successful implementation of United States policy in the transnational setting.
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States officials so that any environmental review is accurate and
helpful; and (7) extent to which conflicting United States law will
be compromised by performing an EIS analysis. These factors
should all be considered in light of the last and perhaps most important consideration, namely, whether the foreign government has
its own regulatory mechanism for protecting its environment or
will consider enviromental factors in its decision to proceed with a
course of action. Courts have already shown some willingness to
consider foreign policy factors in deciding whether to enjoin
United States government activities where an EIS is found to be
inadequate.23 ' By adopting the suggested approach, the courts may
perform a vital function by avoiding a rigid rule of law in an area
where the legal mandate is at best ambiguous and where a principled "rule of reason" methodology will best serve United States
interests in the environmental field, as well as other strategic areas
of foreign policy and national security.

234. See, e.g, Concerned About Trident v. Runsfeld, 555 F.2d at 830; Committee for
Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d at 787.

